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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS*
DAVID HORTON*"

The United States Supreme Court's expansion of the Federal
Arbitration Act (the "FAA") has made arbitration clauses
ubiquitous in consumer and employment contracts and
provoked heated debate. Recently, though, arbitration clauses
have become common in a different context: wills and trusts.
Courts have reached wildly different conclusions about whether
these provisions are enforceable under state arbitration law.
However, no judge, scholar, or litigant has considered the more
importantquestion of whether the FAA governs these terms. This
Article fills that gap. It first examines the statute's text and
legislative history and concludes that Congress intended the FAA
only to cover arbitrationclauses in "contracts." Nevertheless, the
Article shows that the Court has not rigidly enforced this
predicate.As a matter of federal common law, the FAA applies if
there is a plausible argument that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate-even if the arbitration clause does not appear in a
document that meets the black letter test for contractual validity.
The Article then claims that this approach has opened the door
for the FAA to govern testamentary arbitrationclauses. Indeed,
when trustees, executors, and beneficiaries accept fees or
property under a will or trust, they also manifest assent to the
instrument's terms. Finally, the Article analyzes how some of the
most challenging features of the Court's interpretation of the
FAA-including the scope of the statute, the separability
doctrine, and preemption-would play out in the field of wills
and trusts. By doing so, the Article seeks not only to provide
guidance for courts and policymakers but also to illustrate that
testamentary arbitrationmay not suffer from some of the flaws
that make contractualarbitrationso polarizing.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most divisive recent issues in American civil justice
has been the widespread use of arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts. At the center of this storm is the Federal
Arbitration Act (the "FAA").' Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to
make agreements to arbitrate specifically enforceable and thus
provide merchants with a quicker and cheaper alternative to
litigation.2 But in the last three decades, the Supreme Court of the
United States has dramatically expanded the statute's scope,
declaring that it embodies a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration," 3 preempts state law,4 and governs statutory claims. 5 The
1. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(2006)).
2. See, e.g., Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and
Federal Commercial Arbitration:Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 3 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 4213 and S.
4214] ("The bill ... aims to eliminate friction, delay, and waste, and ... to establish and
); GEORGE ScoTr GRAHAM, To VALIDATE CERTAIN
maintain business amity.
AGREEMENTS FOR ARBITRATION, H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT] (recommending that Congress pass the FAA because "there is so much agitation
against the costliness and delays of litigation").
3. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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Court's interpretation of the FAA has ignited an "arbitration war":
"a battle over whether the United States will increasingly have a
privatized system of justice." 6 On one side are courts and scholars
who argue that arbitration facilitates access to justice7 and reduces
litigation costs, thus allowing businesses to lower prices and raise
wages. 8 On the other side are those who claim that fine print dispute
resolution terms deprive individuals of their rights and that the Court
has allowed the FAA to run roughshod over state law. 9
Recently, however, there has been a surge of interest in
arbitration in a different field: wills and trusts. This movement is easy
to understand. Probate is notoriously litigious."0 And disputes over

4. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).
5. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985).
6. Editorial, The Arbitration War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, at A18.
7. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of
Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 401 (2009) ("[A]rbitration can
provide access to adjudicatory services that are affordable, professional, expert, and
enforceable."); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 559,
563-64 (2001) (arguing that arbitration permits employees to resolve low-value claims that
would fall through the cracks in court-based litigation).
8. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 695, 741; Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 582
(2003); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
679, 698-99; Keith N. Hylton, Agreements To Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SuP. CT.ECON. REV. 209, 263 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 89, 89 [hereinafter Ware, Price of Process]; Stephen J. Ware, The Case for
Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-With Particular Consideration of Class
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J.AM. ARB. 251, 255 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Adhesive
ArbitrationAgreements].
9. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,1996
Sup. CT. REV. 331, 332-33; David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 439-40 (2011); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 86-88 [hereinafter Schwartz, Big Business]; David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1250 (2009); Jean R. Sternlight,
Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648-51 (2005)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Just]; Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking
the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637-41
(1996).
10. See, e.g., Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958)
(asserting that wills generate more lawsuits "than any other legal instrument"); Jeffrey P.
Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging and Social Change, in INHERITANCE AND
WEALTH INAMERICA 173, 174 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998)
(asserting that roughly three percent of estates are litigated); John H. Langbein, Will
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estate plans are only expected to become more common. In the next
half-century, Americans will bequeath $41 trillion-the largest
intergenerational wealth transfer in history.11 Testators and settlors
also must divide this bounty among an increasingly fragmented group
of loved ones. Forty percent of current marriages are not first
marriages, and over four million households include stepchildren and
stepparents. 2 Even when these blended families are harmonious,
they are a fertile source of will contests. In addition, the number of
Americans who are over eighty-five will double by 2030 and double
again by 2050.13 With greater longevity comes more age-related
infirmities, which often are the springboard for incapacity and undue
influence claims. 14 Thus, in an effort to prevent time-consuming and

estate-depleting litigation, a rising number of testators and settlors
are placing arbitration clauses in their dispositive instruments. 5
The issue of whether arbitration clauses in wills and trusts are
enforceable "is unresolved in almost every jurisdiction."' 6 Some
Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5 (1994) (book review) ("Because ...there are
millions of probates per year, one-in-a-hundred litigation patterns are very serious.").
11. See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer
Estimate Is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, J. GIFT PLAN., Jan. 2003, at
11, 11 (predicting that even a severe recession will not reduce the amount of wealth
bequeathed in the next half-century).
12. See ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs

/censr-6.pdf.
13. See WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at
6 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Editorial, Lingering Longer: Who Will Care?, WASH.
POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at A23 (noting that the incidence of Alzheimer's disease will likely
triple by 2050).
15. Admittedly, I am not aware of any studies that show that testamentary arbitration
clauses have become more prevalent. However, several factors strongly suggest that this is
indeed the case. First, as I discuss infra Part I.C., reported cases involving arbitration
provisions in wills and trusts have spiked in the last five years. Second, millions of low-and
middle-income seniors have purchased "mill" trusts-standardized, boilerplate-laden
instruments created by non-lawyers-which often contain dispute resolution provisions.
See, e.g., Estate of Swetmann, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457, 460 n.3 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In the past
several years, mounting criticism has been leveled at the marketing of living trusts by
nonlawyers with only cursory oversight by attorneys."); Kathy M. Kristof, Seniors Warned
Against Fast-Talking Living Trust Sellers, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at C4. Third, estate
planners are becoming increasingly intrigued by extrajudicial dispute resolution. See infra
text accompanying note 23.

16. Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parametersfor
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118, 119 (2011). As
a leading casebook puts it, "[tihe authorities are scarce and
DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 608-09 (8th ed.
Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91,
has long been "unclear if parties could arbitrate 'disputes involving

contradictory."

JESSE

2009); see also Amy J.
105 n.84 (noting that it
the validity of a will' "
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courts have prohibited the arbitration of incapacity and undue
influence claims on public policy grounds17 or because the legislature
has given probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.1 8
Other judges have nullified arbitration clauses in testamentary
instruments for the simple reason that state arbitration statutes only
apply to "contracts."19 On the other side of the spectrum, the
American Arbitration Association has promulgated rules for wills
and trusts cases,2" and legislatures in Florida and Arizona have passed
laws that expressly authorize probate arbitration in various contexts. 21
Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce has recently
created a task force to study arbitration clauses in trusts.22
The budding debate about testamentary arbitration has yet to
consider the proverbial elephant in the room: the FAA.23 If the
(quoting WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND

212 (1930))).
17. See, e.g., In re Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (App. Div. 1981).
18. See, e.g., In re Meredith's Estate, 266 N.W. 351, 355 (Mich. 1936); In re Revocation
of Revocable Trust of Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
19. See, e.g., Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004),
superseded by statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v.
Fink, No. I CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601.598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011); Diaz v.
Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2011), opinion vacated by 257 P.3d 1129, 1129
(Cal. 2011).
AWARDS

20. See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION

RULES (2010), availableat www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial
/documents/mdaw/mdaz/-edisp/adrstg__004172.pdf (providing rules for arbitration for wills
and trusts under the AAA).
21. The coverage of these statutes varies significantly. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10205 (2011) (broadly validating arbitration clauses in any "trust instrument...
with regard to the administration or distribution of the trust"), with FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 731.401(1) (West 2010) (permitting arbitration of probate matters "other than disputes
o[ver] the validity of all or a part of a will or trust").
22. Bruno W. Boesch & Alexis Mourre, Task Force on Trusts and Arbitration, INT'L
CHAMBER OF COM., http:llwww.iccwbo.org/policylarbitration/id8222/index.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2012). I am grateful to Chris Drahozal for calling this fact to my attention.
23. The only article of which I am aware that even mentions the FAA and wills and
trusts in passing is E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275 (1999). Spitko eloquently argues that arbitration can shield the
testamentary wishes of minorities from courts and juries imposing hegemonic norms. See
id. at 294-95. Because he focuses exclusively on those issues, he does not analyze whether
the FAA applies in the probate milieu. See id. at 303-04 (assuming without discussion that
the FAA governs wills and trusts). Other than Professor Spitko's piece, the broader topic
of arbitration in probate matters has received little attention. Cf generally Blaine
Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisionsin Trust Instruments,55
CALIF. L. REV. 521 (1967) (briefly addressing the legal roadblocks to various forms of
extrajudicial resolution of trusts disputes). Most recent articles on testamentary
arbitration, although thoughtful contributions to the literature, (1) do not address the
FAA and (2) are written by and intended for practitioners. See, e.g., Jonathan G.
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statute applies to arbitration clauses in estate plans, it has the
potential to transform probate dispute resolution, as it has swept
through the rest of the civil justice system. This Article considers that
issue and reaches two main conclusions. First, it argues that the FAA
likely governs arbitration clauses in wills and trusts. To be sure,
Congress almost certainly meant to limit the FAA to arbitration
clauses in "contracts." Nevertheless, in the topsy-turvy world of
federal arbitration law, the blueprint written by Congress is just one
factor in how the Court interprets the statute. As several Justices and
scholars have noted, the Court has "abandoned all pretense of
ascertaining congressional intent[,] ...building instead, case by case,

an edifice of its own creation. ' 24 To further its pro-arbitration agenda,
the Court has not required that an arbitration clause be embedded in
a document that satisfies the black letter test for contractual validity.
Instead, the Court has predicated the FAA's applicability on the
mere fact that the parties can plausibly be said to have agreed to
arbitrate. Because estate plans create a network of consensual,
contract-like relationships, some testamentary arbitration clauses
trigger the FAA.
Second, the Article argues that the FAA should be less
objectionable in probate than it is in the consumer and employment
settings. Critics argue that the Court's interpretation of the FAA
suffers from two main flaws: (1) it permits corporations to deprive
individuals of their rights on a non-consensual basis, and (2) it has all

Blattmachr, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation Through Disclosure, In Terrorem
Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 237, 261-62 (2008);
Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions:A Powerful
Tool To Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, but Are They Enforceable?, 42
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 354 (2007); cf. Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable
Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL. 627,
641 (2011) (briefly noting that the FAA does not apply to testamentary instruments
because "only an arbitration provision in a contract is enforceable").
24. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646-51
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of having effectively rewritten the
statute). In addition, many scholars have challenged the Court's conclusion that the FAA
preempts state law. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 145 (1992); Margaret L.
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration
Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 127-30 (2006); Larry J.
Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory
Interpretation,Stare Decisis, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 792 (2002);
David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23-25
(2004).
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but precluded states from regulating arbitration.25 Several factors
diminish these concerns in the context of wills and trusts. For one,
differences between adhesion contracts (which usually go unread)
and testamentary instruments (which stem from a more robust form
of assent) make testamentary arbitration more palatable. Moreover,
there are significant holes in the FAA's coverage of estate-related
matters, leaving ample room for state regulation. For instance, the
Judiciary Act of 1789 does not give federal courts jurisdiction over
"core probate" issues-petitions to administer an estate or nullify a
will.26 Thus, reading the FAA to encompass these cases would be
perverse: it would not only extend federal power into a sphere that
has long been the exclusive province of the states, but it would mean
that the FAA creates federal arbitration law that federal courts
cannot enforce. As a result, the FAA does not govern these disputes.
Likewise, the FAA's controversial separability doctrine-the fiction
that arbitration clauses are their own, independent contracts nestled
within broader "container" contracts-applies in a diluted form to
estate plans. These limits on the FAA give states an opportunity to
develop their own probate arbitration principles.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the evolution of
testamentary arbitration. It reveals that courts have long disagreed
about whether arbitration clauses in wills and trusts are enforceable.
It then shows that the majority of recent cases have invalidated
testamentary arbitration clauses, creating serious tension between
state and federal arbitration law. Part II examines whether the FAA
applies to arbitration clauses in estate plans. It analyzes the FAA's
text and legislative history and concludes that Congress intended to
limit the statute to arbitration clauses in "contracts." However, Part II
then explains why, as a matter of federal common law, the FAA now
governs arbitration clauses in wills and trusts. Finally, Part III
considers how several challenging aspects of the Court's reading of
the FAA-including the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, the
boundaries of the statute, the separability doctrine, and preemptionwould function in the testamentary milieu. By doing so, it illustrates
that the statute can be imported into probate in a way that
ameliorates some of its flaws.

25. See supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text.
26. See Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80 (1789); Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 205 (1918); see
also infra Part III.B (discussing the so-called "probate exception" to federal subject matter
jurisdiction in greater detail).
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I. TESTAMENTARY ARBITRATION
Although

scholars

have

lavished

sustained

attention

on

contractual arbitration, they have all but ignored testamentary
arbitration. This Part traces the evolution of arbitration in probate. It
shows that courts have struggled with how to conceptualize
arbitration clauses in wills and trusts, leading to a rash of conflicting
approaches. It then argues that this ambivalence about arbitration
clauses in estate plans is on a collision course with the Court's
expansive reading of the FAA.
A.

Testamentary Arbitration Before the FAA

American courts inherited a deep suspicion of arbitration.
Ancient English precedent allowed parties to retract their consent to
arbitrate (the "revocability" doctrine)27 and nullified arbitration
clauses as improper8 efforts to divest courts of their jurisdiction (the
"ouster" doctrine). For the most part, from the nation's founding
until the early twentieth century, these anti-arbitration measures also
prevailed in the United States.29 At the same time, though, merchants
often voluntarily engaged in extrajudicial dispute resolution, citing its
speed and informality.3"

During this period, there were also glimmers of recognition that
arbitration could be useful in a different context: probate. For

27. See, e.g., Vynior's Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.) 599-601; 8 Co. Rep. 81 b,
82 a-83 b (holding that parties could withdraw their consent to arbitrate at any time
before the arbitrator ruled).
28. See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.) 532; 1 Wils. K.B. 129
(finding that "the agreement of the parties cannot oust this Court").
29. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) ("[A]greements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.");
Farmer v. Bd. of Trade, 78 Mo. App. 557, 566 (Ct. App. 1899) ("It is well known that
parties can not by agreement to arbitrate future differences, oust the courts of
jurisdiction."); Butler v. Greene, 68 N.W. 496, 498 (Neb. 1896) ("It is elementary law that
a submission [to arbitration] may be revoked before the award .... "); Wright v.
Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 20 A. 716, 717 (Pa. 1885) ("It is not in the power of the
parties thus to oust the courts of their general jurisdiction."). However, some jurisdictions
were more hospitable to arbitration. For instance, as early as 1645, the Connecticut
General Assembly authorized courts to refer matters to arbitration so "unnecessary tryalls
by Jury ... might be prevented." Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law:
ArbitrationBefore the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 452 (1984) (quoting 1
THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 117 (J. Hammond Trumbull
ed., 1850)).
30. See, e.g., JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW

vii-ix (1918) (noting that there was an active arbitration practice in nineteenth-century
New York that worked in conjunction with the Chamber of Commerce).
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example, George Washington included a broad arbitration clause in
his will:
[A]ll disputes (if unhappily any should arise) shall be decided

by three impartial and intelligent men, known for their probity
and good understanding ... [who] shall, unfettered by Law, or
legal constructions, declare their Sense of the Testator's
intention; and such decision is, to all intents and purposes to be

as binding on the parties as if it had been given in the Supreme
Court of the United States.31
Likewise, heirs and beneficiaries sometimes agreed to submit existing
differences to referees or umpires.32 In fact, beginning in the late

nineteenth century, the Alabama Probate Code authorized private
dispute resolution,3 3 and a Kansas statute validated arbitration in

"matter[s] arising in the settlement of the estates of deceased
parties."3 4

Arguably, individuals embroiled in probate had even greater
need for arbitration than businessmen with commercial disputes. For
testators, arbitration minimized the collateral damage from will
contests. These suits were notorious for "wast[ing] vast estates, by
protracted and extravagant litigation.

'35

Moreover, they were usually

grounded on allegations of incapacity and undue influence: intrusive
claims that exposed a testator's foibles and intimate life in open

31. George Washington, Last Will and Testament, REDISCOVERING GEORGE
http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/collection/other-last-will.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2012).
32. See, e.g., Tallman v. Tallman, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 325, 325-26 (1850) (explaining
that decedent's sons "submitted to arbitration all matters and things whatsoever arising
out of the will and estate of ... [their father]" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Dandridge v. Lyon, Wythe 123, 124 (Va. High Ct. Ch. 1791), available at 1791 WL 261, at
*1 (noting that feuding beneficiaries "submitted the controversy between them to the
arbitrament of three men, consenting that their award should be made the judgement of
the court").
33. Holdsomebeck v. Fancher, 20 So. 519, 520 (Ala. 1896) ("[T]he probate court ...
has authority to refer all matters of controversy ... to arbitration, if in the opinion of the
court, the interests of the parties can be best subserved thereby, and the parties, or their
attorneys, consent thereto .... " (citation omitted)); see also Stephen Duane Davis II &
Alfred L. Brophy, "The Most Solemn Act of My Life": Family, Property, Will, and Trust in
the Antebellum South, 62 ALA. L. REV. 757, 791-92 (2011) (finding an arbitration clause in
a will from Greene County, Alabama, in 1843).
34. Anderson v. Beebe, 22 Kan. 768, 770 (1879). Although the statute was not
arbitration-specific, it broadly stated "that all persons who shall have any controversy or
controversies may arbitrate them." Id. (citation omitted)).
35. Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501, 505 (1881).
WASHINGTON,
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court.36 Arbitration's speed and privacy made it an attractive

substitute. Arbitration also allowed heirs and beneficiaries to opt out
of court-supervised estate administration, which had long been
despised for its inefficiency.37
However, arbitration clauses in probate matters raised unique
issues. For one, although the streamlined, informal nature of
arbitration is well-suited to in personam disputes between merchants,

probate hearings are often in rem. For instance, when a court finds
that a will is enforceable, it generates an order that attaches to the
estate and is "binding on the whole world."38 Probate courts thus
must comply with onerous notice requirements and give all affected
individuals a chance to be heard.39 Some judges concluded that this
made testamentary arbitration untenable. For instance, in Carpenter
v. Bailey,4" the Supreme Court of California struck down an
agreement by a group of beneficiaries to arbitrate a will contest,

declaring that "[a] few individuals, claiming to be the heirs, cannot by
41
stipulation, determine such controversy.

On the other hand, even in states that followed the ouster
doctrine, it was often unclear whether a will or trust included an
"arbitration" clause at all. As a prosaic estate planning technique,
testators or settlors often gave executors or trustees tremendous

36. See, e.g., Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898) ("[A]fter the death
of a testator, unexpected difficulties arise, ... contests are commenced wherein not
infrequently are brought to light matters of private life that ought never to be made public,
and in respect to which the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in explanation or
denial .... "); Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928) ("To most persons such
exposure to publicity of their own personality is distasteful, if not abhorrent.").
37. See, e.g., Casstevens v. Casstevens, 81 N.E. 709, 712 (Il. 1907) (noting that an
intestate decedent's heirs had opted out of intestacy and chosen to have an arbitrator
distribute his property "for the purpose of saving the expenses of court proceeding");
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOuSE 3 (1853) (describing a probate case that had
"drone[d] on" for generations and "become so complicated, that no man alive knows what
it means").
38. Carpenter v. Bailey, 60 P. 162, 163 (Cal. 1900).
39. See, e.g., Fort v. Battle, 21 Miss. (13 S. & M.) 133, 139 (High Ct. Err. & App. 1849)
(describing some of these notice requirements).
40. 60 P. 162 (Cal. 1900).
41. Id. at 163; see also Fort, 21 Miss. (13 S. & M.) at 140 (invalidating arbitration
award because of "[t]he want of the requisite notice"); Miller v. Moore, 7 Serg. & Rawle
164, 166 (Pa. 1821) (nullifying arbitration award because not all parties were represented
in the proceeding). But see Anderson v. Beebe, 22 Kan. 768, 770 (1879) (rejecting the
argument that probate matters "can only be adjudicated in the probate court"); In re
Johnson, 127 N.W. 133, 137 (Neb. 1910) (enforcing submission to arbitration even though
the "validity of the will offered for probate was in dispute").
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flexibility to invest, manage, divide, or distribute their property.42

Some testators or settlors went a step further and entrusted the
executor or trustee with settling any conflict about their wishes.
Although these terms overrode the jurisdiction of the courts, most
judges upheld them. 43 For instance, in Pray v. Belt,' the Supreme

Court of the United States held that a testator properly allowed his
executors to decide "whatever they determine[d was his] intention...
without any resort to a Court of Justice."45 The Court noted that the
clause "preserv[ed]
peace and prevent[ed] expensive and frivolous
46
litigation.

Similarly, some judges conceptualized arbitration clauses in wills
and trusts as testamentary conditions. Testators or settlors sometimes
attach strings to gifts, allowing beneficiaries to inherit only if they
marry within a particular religious faith or meet other benchmarks.47
Likewise, testators or settlors often attempt to ensure fidelity to their

wishes through no-contest clauses, which disinherit anyone who
brings litigation relating to the estate. 48 To some judges, there was no
difference

between

these provisos

and a requirement

that a

42. See, e.g., Beck's Appeal, 9 A. 942, 943 (Pa. 1887) (describing a clause that gave the
executor " 'full and unlimited power and authority to appropriate or dispose' of it 'to such
objects, persons, or institutions as in his discretion shall be best and proper' "); In re
McAllister's Estate, 15 Pa. D. 430, 430 (Orphans' Ct. 1906) (containing a clause that
specified that executors "shall divide among my children as they may deem best, and I
wish, in this division, that my executors should have arbitrary power, as they know my
reasons").
43. Courts generally construed these provisions to contain the implicit limitation that
the executors wield their decision-making power reasonably and in good faith. See, e.g.,
Am. Bd. of Comm'rs of Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696, 700 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883);
Talladega Coll. v. Callanan, 197 N.W. 635, 637 (Iowa 1924).
44. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 670 (1828).
45. Id. at 679 (quoting the testator's will).
46. Id. at 680; McAllister's, 15 Pa. D. at 430 (upholding clause that allowed executors
to divide the testator's personal estate among his children "as they may deem best" and
added his wish that they should have arbitrary power, "as they know [his] reasons"). But
see In re Reilly's Estate, 49 A. 939, 940-41 (Pa. 1901) (invalidating a similar provision
because "[a] testator may not deny to his legatees the right of appeal to the regularly
constituted courts").
47. See, e.g., Maddox v. Maddox's Adm'r, 52 Va. (6 Gratt.) 804, 804 (1854) (stating in
the facts that testator required his niece to remain single or marry only a member of the
Society of Friends); Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1332-35 (2011) (explaining the Roman origins of conditional
bequests).
48. See Anonymous, (1674) 86 Eng. Rep. 910 (C.B.) 910; 2 Mod. 7, 7 (enforcing clause
that provided "[i]f A. molest B. by suit or otherwise, he shall lose what is devised to him,
and it shall go to B"). See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Rob G. Dickinson & Kenneth L.
Wake, The Fine Art of IntimidatingDisgruntledBeneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51
SMU L. REV. 225 (1998) (tracing the history of no-contest clauses).
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beneficiary arbitrate her legal claims. Thus, several courts held that a
testator or settlor's right to mandate arbitration flowed naturally from
his power to "annex conditions ... to his bequests."49
In sum, by the end of the nineteenth century, there was little
consensus about how to treat arbitration of probate matters. As the
Article discusses next, the passage and expansion of the FAA would
soon transform arbitration law. But rather than clarifying the status of
testamentary arbitration, these events magnified the uncertainty
about the topic.
B.

The FAA

As the twentieth century began, commercial arbitration became
more common. A few states whittled away at the revocability and
ouster doctrines, preventing parties from retracting their assent to
arbitrate in certain circumstances" and authorizing arbitrators to
resolve discrete factual issues, such as the value of an object or the
amount of damages caused by an injury.51 However, these rules
varied significantly by jurisdiction. Thus, pro-arbitration lobbyists set
their sights on Washington and attempted to persuade lawmakers to
enact a federal statute that would make arbitration clauses
"universally enforceable."5 2
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA. 53 The statute's core
provision, section 2, abolishes the ouster and revocability doctrines by
making arbitration clauses presumptively valid:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, ... or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy ... shall be valid,
49. Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 9, 11 (1873); see also Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va.
362, 374 (1886) (enforcing arbitration clause in will because "[t]he testator has full
dominion over his property with the absolute right ... to do with and dispose of it in any
manner or to whomever his will or caprice may suggest").
50. For instance, some courts required "good cause" for the revocation. See Poppers
v. Knight, 69 Ill. App. 578, 579 (1897). Some made submissions irrevocable if they were
founded on separate consideration. See Everhart v. Flynn, 6 Pa. D. 131, 132 (Ct. Com. P.
1896). Finally, another court deemed parties to have waived the right to revoke after the
arbitrator ruled. See Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. O'Fallon, 69 N.W. 118, 119 (Neb. 1896).
51. See, e.g., Comment, Arbitration Contracts,33 YALE L.J. 90, 92 (1923).
52. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 279 (1995); see also
MACNEIL, supra note 24, at 41-45 (tracing the history of the FAA).
53. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(2006)).
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irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 4
The FAA's initial impact was minimal. For starters, it did not
seem to be a declaration of substantive law. Instead, it appeared to be
a procedural statute enacted under Congress's Article III power to
control federal courts.55 As a result, the overwhelming consensus was
that the FAA neither applied in state court nor preempted state law.
Until the 1960s, litigants virtually never attempted to invoke the
statute in state court, 56 and state judges and lawmakers felt free to
adopt specific anti-arbitration rules that echoed the ouster and
revocability doctrines. 7 Courts also exempted many cases from
arbitration. Under what became known as the non-arbitrability
doctrine, judges denied motions to compel arbitration of antitrust,58

securities, 59 pension, 60 and patent disputes, 61 and refused to grant
preclusive effect to arbitrators' rulings on claims under civil rights
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).

55. For example, the Report of the House Judiciary Committee flatly declared that
"[w]hether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure ... and not one of substantive law." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
Similarly, in a brief lodged in the congressional record, Julius Henry Cohen, the author of
the FAA, declared that "[t]here is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission to arbitration
enforcement." Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005
and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 40 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646]. On the other hand, Congress also
invoked its Commerce Clause power to pass the statute. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note
2, at 1 ("The remedy is founded also upon the [f]ederal control over interstate commerce
.... "). The issue of whether this means that lawmakers intended the FAA to apply in
state court or simply saw the Commerce Clause as an additional source of authority for
enacting a procedural statute to govern federal courts remains fiercely contested. Compare
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 128 (2002) (arguing that
Congress intended the FAA to rise and fall with the Commerce power but noting that the
Commerce power was much more limited in 1925), with Schwartz, supra note 24, at 23
(arguing that there is "nothing anomalous about Congress enacting a procedural or
remedial statute, as opposed to substantive law, pursuant to its ... commerce power").
56. See MACNEIL, supra note 24, at 127-28.
57. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (citing CAL. CORP.
CODE § 31512 (West 1971)) (exempting franchise agreements from mandatory
arbitration); Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Emp. Ins. Co., 398 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1965)
(citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-1 (LexisNexis 1953)) (invalidating agreements to submit
future disputes to arbitration).
58. See, e.g., Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir.
1978); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
59. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,435 (1953).
60. See, e.g., Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271,
277 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
61. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585,593 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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statutes.62 They did so because they believed that Congress could not
have meant to relegate important public law matters to arbitration,
which they saw as an inferior forum that "cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding. '"63
However, in the last half of the twentieth century, the Court
began to expand the FAA. First, in 1967, the Court articulated the
separability doctrine in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Manufacturing Co.' Under this rule, "arbitration clauses as a matter
of federal law are 'separable' from the contracts in which they are
embedded. ' 65 That is, every contract that contains an arbitration
clause is, in fact, two contracts: (1) the overarching "container"
contract, and (2) the arbitration clause, which is its own independent
contract. The rule comes into play when a party alleges that a contract
that includes an arbitration clause is invalid under a defense such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 66 If the party seeks to overturn the
container contract, the free-standing agreement to arbitrate kicks in,
and an arbitrator (not a judge) must resolve the matter. 67 As a result,
even if there are clear indications that the container contract is
invalid, the case goes to arbitration. Only if the party argues that the
arbitration clause itself is unenforceable can a court decide the issue.68
Then, in the 1980s, the Court began to revolutionize federal
arbitration law. Seeking a salve for the so-called "litigation
explosion," it announced that the statute expresses "a liberal federal
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984); Barrentine v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974); Criswell v. W. Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 547-48 (9th Cir.

1983).
63. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985).
64. 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
65. Id. at 402.
66. As I will discuss later, the separability doctrine (apparently) does not apply when
a party alleges that she never actually entered into the container contract (as opposed to
arguing that the container contract is invalid under a defense to enforcement). See infra
text accompanying notes 183-85.
67. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04; see also Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382
F.3d 624, 629 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[M]utual mistake ...amounts to an attack on the
underlying liability, and only derivatively on the obligation to arbitrate.").
68. For instance, in Prima Paint, Flood & Conklin ("F&C") entered into a consulting
agreement (the "container contract") with Prima Paint that contained an arbitration
clause. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 397-98. Prima Paint then alleged that the container
contract was invalid because F&C had fraudulently misrepresented that it was solvent and
could perform its consulting obligations. Id. at 398. Because Prima Paint's fraud claim did
not specifically challenge the validity of the arbitration clause, the Court compelled
arbitration. Id. at 402 ("[W]here no claim is made that fraud was directed to the
arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will be held to encompass arbitration of
the claim that the [container] contract itself was induced by fraud.").
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policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary."69 In its widely
reviled opinion in Southland v. Keating,7" the Court held that the
FAA applies in state court and preempts state law.71 As the Court's
membership evolved, it became clear that few sitting Justices believed
that Southland was correct.7 2 Nevertheless, citing the importance of
stare decisis in the domain of statutory interpretation, the Court
continued to find that the FAA trumped state law.73 Because the
FAA makes traditional contract defenses-"grounds ...for the
revocation of any contract"-the sole means to nullify an arbitration
clause, the Court explained that the statute overrides any state rule
"that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to

69. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); cf
Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (tst Cir. 1989) (calling the FAA
"therapy for the ailment of the crowded docket"). For a description of the concern about
the "litigation explosion," see generally Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
70. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
71. Id. at 15-16. The California Franchise Investment Act states that "[a]ny condition,
stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive
compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." CAL.
CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 2006). The Supreme Court of California held that this antiwaiver provision bars arbitration clauses in franchise agreements. See Keating v. Superior
Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198-99 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part sub nom., Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). In addition, the state high court determined that the FAA did
not preempt the Franchise Investment Act because the state law did not stem from
hostility toward arbitration. See id. at 1202-03. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, relying heavily on the fact that Congress passed the FAA by invoking the
Commerce Clause, which "normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as well as
federal courts." Southland, 465 U.S. at 12. For criticism of Southland, see Carrington &
Haagen, supra note 9, at 380 (arguing that "the opinion of the Court was an
extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation" of the FAA's legislative history); Schwartz,
supra note 24, at 5 (calling the case "an embarrassment to a Court whose majority is
supposed to be leading a federalism revival, if not a federalism revolution"). But see
Drahozal, supra note 55, at 105-07 (agreeing that Chief Justice Burger's analysis is
unsatisfactory but defending its conclusion by analyzing the FAA's legislative history in
greater detail).
72. Justices Scalia and Thomas replaced Chief Justice Burger and Justice Marshall,
both of whom had voted with the Southland majority. Staunch federalists, Justices Scalia
and Thomas opposed the expansion of the FAA at the expense of state law. See, e.g.,
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act."); id. at 286 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The statute that Congress enacted actually applies only in federal courts.");
see also Schwartz, supra note 24, at 6 ("[I]t may be that no Justice on th[e] Court believes
Southland was correctly decided.").
73. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (calling
Southland "wrong" but agreeing to follow it because of stare decisis).
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arbitrate is at issue."74 For instance, the Court found that the FAA

eclipsed state laws that barred arbitration clauses in wage disputes"
or required drafters to give conspicuous notice on the first page of a
contract that it included an arbitration clause.7 6

The Court also scaled back the non-arbitrability doctrine. In
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., the Court
compelled arbitration of complex antitrust claims, explaining that
arbitration was equal to litigation:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.78
The Court did not abolish the non-arbitrability doctrine; indeed,
it opined that judges could deny arbitration if a plaintiff proved either
that she could not vindicate her statutory rights in the arbitral forum79
or that there was an "inherent conflict" between the FAA and
another federal statute. 80 But in subsequent cases, the Court quickly
dismissed any assertion that seemed too close to a frontal assault on
the efficacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
According to the Court, these "generalized attacks on arbitration""s
were hopelessly anachronistic: "We are well past the time [of] judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration...."I
In an effort to capitalize on the Court's jurisprudence, businesses
from all corners of the economy placed arbitration clauses in their

74. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) ("[Sltate law, whether of legislative
or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.").
75. Id. at 489-90.
76. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,687 (1996).
77. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
78. Id. at 628.
79. See id. at 637 ("[So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function.").
80. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
81. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991); see also
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (citing as
precedent the cases that shifted away from judicial suspicion on the desirability of
arbitration).
82. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
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consumer and employment agreements. 83 Many companies also
unilaterally grafted arbitration clauses into their existing contracts by
mailing non-descript "bill stuffers" to their customers.' 4 These
modifications often stated that they became effective unless a
consumer closed her account within thirty days. 85 Critics began to
protest that because adherents neither read nor understood fine print
dispute resolution terms, "mandatory arbitration is nonconsensual."86
As one judge put it, "[t]he reality that the average consumer
frequently loses his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the
court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy,
receives medical attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is
overwhelming to the body politic."87
In addition, mass arbitration revived the debate about standard
form contracts.88 Some courts and scholars argued that arbitration
clauses in adhesion contracts are efficient. 89 This constituency claimed
that arbitration reduces litigation costs and that competition prompts

drafters to pass these savings on to customers and employees. 9 In

fact, the theory proceeds, because litigation is usually a remote
possibility at the time of contracting, most adherents would choose to
have a small amount of extra money in their pockets rather than

83. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, A Weapon Against Liability: Fine Print Often Removes
Jury Resolution as Option for Complaints, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2000, at 25A,
available at 2000 WLNR 9445249 (citing American Bar Association estimates that more
than one thousand major companies insert arbitration clauses in their contracts).
84. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral
Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 623 (2010) (describing how Bank of America and
Wells Fargo unilaterally added an arbitration clause in over twenty-five million customer
agreements in 1992).
85. See id. at 624-26.
86. Schwartz, Big Business, supra note 9, at 58 ("[I]f an arbitration clause has been
inserted in a contract of adhesion on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis, it is difficult to
characterize it as the product of 'consent,' 'agreement' or 'bargaining.' "); Sternlight, Just,
supra note 9, at 1649.
87. Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999).
88. For an overview of the pre-arbitration literature on adhesion contracts, see
Horton, supra note 84, at 615-19.
89. See sources cited supra note 8.
90. See, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d
989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) ("As long as the market is competitive, sellers must adopt terms
that buyers find acceptable; onerous terms just lead to lower prices."); Ware, Price of
Process, supra note 8, at 89 ("[A]rbitration lowers the prices (and interest rates)
consumers pay because competition forces businesses to pass their cost-savings on to
consumers."); Ware, Adhesive ArbitrationAgreements, supra note 8, at 255 ("[W]hatever
lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices to consumers.").
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retain the right to pursue claims before a judge. 91 Yet others on the
bench and in the academy were not persuaded. In particular, these
skeptics noted that consumers and employees systematically
underestimate the cost of waiving procedural rights ex ante, casting
doubt on whether the law should credit their seeming consent to
remedy-stripping arbitration provisions. 92 Moreover, this group noted
that if arbitration clauses are not "salient"-do not actually affect
adherents' choices about products, services, and jobs-then adherents
will not be able to force drafters to offer optimal dispute resolution
terms. 93 Instead, no matter what most consumers and employees
actually prefer, companies will engage in a race to the bottom,
slashing procedural entitlements in order to one-up each other on the
higher-profile issues of price or wages.9 4

For the most part, the Court has refused to engage in this
debate.95 To this day, it continues to describe arbitration-even when
imposed through adhesion contracts-as "a matter of consent, not
coercion." 96 This sweeping claim allows the Court to rigorously

enforce arbitration clauses in all contexts, from deals between
sophisticated entities to collective bargaining agreements to consumer
and employment contracts. But as discussed next, the Court's robust
pro-arbitration policy has never extended into a related form of
private ordering: the realm of wills and trusts.
C.

Testamentary ArbitrationAfter the FAA

Although the FAA was relatively dormant for the first four
decades of its existence, it changed the way that arbitration was
perceived. For instance, even long before the statute applied in state
91. Cf. Drahozal, supra note 8, at 749 (noting that adherents may be "willing to give
up the right to bring high-dollar but rare claims before a jury in exchange for the ability to
pursue low-dollar but more common claims in arbitration").
92. See Horton, supra note 84, at 648.
93. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting
that "while lower costs can produce lower charges, they can also produce higher profits"),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); cf Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1225 (2003) (explaining why non-salient terms may be inefficient).
94. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of ProceduralPrivate Ordering,97 VA. L. REV.
723, 760-61 (2011) (describing how the market pushes companies to offer one-sided
procedural terms and price reductions/wage increases).
95. Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (opining that a
forum selection clause printed on the back of a cruise ship ticket benefitted both
contracting parties by lowering litigation costs and therefore "reduc[ing] fares").
96. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010); Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
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courts, state judges began to announce that "[i]f there ever was public
policy against agreements to arbitrate, it has disappeared."97 Yet this
newfound acceptance of arbitration was limited to the commercial
context. In fact, ironically, the FAA's passage coincided with a period
of distrust of arbitration in probate matters.
For example, in Campbell v. Detroit Trust Co. (In re Meredith's
Estate),9" decided in 1936, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a
contract to arbitrate a will contest. 99 The testator signed a will and
then a codicil, naming different executors. These two executors
agreed to have a third party decide whether the testator possessed
sufficient mental capacity to create the codicil.10 Yet under state law,
executors, who are not beneficiaries, lack standing to challenge the
validity of a will. 1 ' The state high court cited this legal nuance to
justify its refusal to enforce the arbitration contract, noting that the
executors have "no pecuniary interest in the estate." ' 2 But the court
also went on, reasoning that two individuals could not conspire to
arbitrate a matter that was in rem and thus would affect "[t]he rights
of all concerned or interested in the estate."'0 3 Finally, noting that the
legislature had entrusted the judiciary with determining whether to
admit a will to probate, the court employed the rhetoric of the ouster
doctrine: "No stipulation ...can oust the jurisdiction of the probate
court, permit the probate judge to abdicate his jurisdiction and power,
or delegate it to a third person ....10
The Meredith's Estate decision was controversial. It provoked a
vigorous dissent by Justice Sharpe, who protested that "courts favor
arbitration and will recognize this type of agreement when not
contrary to public policy."1 5 Likewise, a year later, a Note in the
HarvardLaw Review urged courts to read the opinion for the narrow
proposition that executors lack the authority to submit will contests to

97. Rueda v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 175 P.2d 778,790 (Or. 1946).

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936).
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 355.
Id.

103. Id. at 356. The codicil merely appointed a new executor rather than altering the
disposition of the testator's property among the beneficiaries. See id. at 352. Thus, it is
unclear why the court felt that all potentially affected parties were not before the
arbitrator.

104. Id. at 357.
105. Id. at 359 (Sharpe, J., dissenting).
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arbitration, "rather than authority for the broad rule that there can be
10 6
no arbitration in probate proceedings."'
Nevertheless, in 1968, a New York appellate court reached the
same conclusion as Meredith's Estate.107 Four beneficiaries agreed to
submit all issues relating to the probate of the testator's will to an
"ecclesiastical tribunal" made up of three rabbis. 108 The court
reasoned that this procedure denied the rights of the testator's
creditors and other heirs.109 In addition, it explained that arbitration
would have been improper even if all parties had been represented.
As the court saw it, because state law tasks probate judges with
determining "the testamentary capacity of the decedent, the
genuineness of the will, and the validity of its execution, ....any
attempt to arbitrate such issue[s] is against public policy.""' Long
after the FAA's enactment, the ouster doctrine was alive and well in
probate.
Remarkably, even as the Supreme Court began to interpret the
FAA broadly, state courts continued to express skepticism about
testamentary arbitration. For instance, in its watershed 1991 decision
in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,"' the Court expanded the
domain of contractual arbitration by requiring the plaintiff to
arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim. 2 The
plaintiff alleged that he could not effectively pursue his rights in the
extrajudicial forum, citing its limited discovery, lack of written
opinions and equitable relief, and potentially biased decision
makers. 3 The Court rejected these arguments as "far out of step with
our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.""' 4 But this pro-arbitration approach
did not apply to testamentary arbitration. Indeed, just a year after

106. Recent Case, Validity of Executors' Stipulation To Arbitrate Mental Capacity, 50
HARV. L. REV. 537, 537 (1937). Despite these criticisms, the New York Supreme Court
soon opined in a one-paragraph decision that "the distribution of a decedent's estate ...
would not constitute an arbitrable controversy." Swislocki v. Spiewak, 75 N.Y.S.2d 147,
147 (App. Div. 1947).
107. In re Will of Jacobovitz, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (Sur. Ct. 1968).

108. Id. at 528-29.
109. Id. at 530.
110. Id. at 530-31; see also In re Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692 (App. Div. 1981) (citing
the language from the Jacobovitz decision to support the conclusion that the probate
cannot be subject to arbitration because it is contrary to public policy).
111. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
112. Id. at 35.
113. Id. at 30-32.

114. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 480 U.S.
477, 481 (1989)).
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Gilmer, a Pennsylvania appellate court held that public policy forbade
an arbitrator from deciding whether a settlor had testamentary
capacity. 1 5 In stark contrast to Gilmer, the court reasoned that
arbitration was inferior to litigation:
[T]he factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent
to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings
is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. And as this
Court has recognized, [a]rbitrators have no obligation to the
court to give their reasons for an award." 6
Recently, the latent tension between the FAA and probate
arbitration has produced a rash of inconsistent decisions. In 2009, a
Michigan appellate court overruled Meredith's Estate (a decision by
its own supreme court) by holding that an arbitrator properly
nullified a will on the grounds of undue influence and incapacity."'
The court was not troubled by the in rem nature of the proceeding
because all known beneficiaries had taken part in the arbitration." 8 In
addition, the court observed that attitudes toward alternative dispute
resolution had changed dramatically in the seventy-five years since
Meredith's Estate."9 Although the court did not discuss the FAA, it
cited several leading United States Supreme Court cases and
reasoned that "[w]hile our legal system may have had only a
lukewarm tolerance for arbitration in the past, it now embraces
arbitration as an expeditious, inexpensive, and fair means of dispute
resolution."' ° Even the dissent "agree[d] that the Michigan Supreme
Court would overrule Meredith if faced with this precise issue today,"
but it merely objected that the lower appellate court should not do so
on its own.' 2'
115. In re Revocation of Revocable Trust of Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992).
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W.2d 720, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
118. Id. As noted above, it is unclear that this fact truly distinguishes Meredith's Estate,
where the only parties who had a real stake in the case-the executors-were also the
parties who agreed to arbitrate it. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
119. Nestorovski, 769 N.W.2d at 720-31.
120. Id. at 729 (quoting Hetrick v. Friedman, 602 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999)).
121. Id. at 737 (Saad, C.J., dissenting). Likewise, courts in other jurisdictions have
permitted arbitration in matters revolving around trust administration. See, e.g., In re
Kalikow, 872 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (App. Div. 2009) (compelling arbitration of contract
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But at the opposite pole, several courts have refused to enforce
arbitration clauses in disputes related to the management (rather than
the validity) of an estate plan. a2 2 The rationale in these decisions is
simple: state arbitration statutes make arbitration clauses enforceable
' 123
in "contracts," and testamentary instruments are "not contracts."
For instance, in Schoneberger v. Oelze, 124 the Arizona Court of
Appeals drew a bright line between trusts and contracts:
Arbitration rests on an exchange of promises. Parties to a
contract may decide to exchange promises to substitute an
arbitral for a judicial forum ....In contrast, a trust does not
rest on an exchange of promises. A trust merely requires a
trustor to transfer a beneficial interest in property to a trustee
who, under the trust instrument ...holds that interest for the
beneficiary. The undertaking between trustor and trustee does
of
not stem from the premise of mutual assent to an exchange
125
promises and is not properly characterized as contractual.
Similarly, in Rachal v. Reitz,'126 an en banc panel of the Texas
Court of Appeals refused to compel arbitration of a breach of trust
claim. 127 The court explained that trusts, unlike contracts, do not

dispute relating to estate); In re Shalik, No. 340361, 2006 WL 2944658, at *2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
Oct. 13, 2006) (same).
122. See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded
by statute, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (Supp. 2011), as recognized in Jones v. Fink,
No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011) (invalidating
arbitration clause in suit for breach of trust); In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 408 (D.C.
2006) (nullifying arbitration clause in "dispute over administration of the trust"); Rachal v.
Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex. App. 2011) (en banc) (refusing to enforce arbitration
clause in petition to compel trustee to account). In addition, a California appellate court
recently struck down an arbitration clause in a dispute over trustee removal. See Diaz v.
Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 615 (Ct. App. 2011). However, the Supreme Court of
California recently granted review of the opinion. See 257 P.3d 1129, 1129 (Cal. Aug. 10,
2011).
123. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1082; see also Diaz, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13 (noting that
the California Arbitration Act "requires the existence of a contract" and "there is no
evidence that the beneficiaries gave either their consent or consideration to achieve the
status of beneficiary"); Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 311 ("[T]his type of trust is not a contract.").
124. 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
125. Id. at 1083 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In 2008, the Arizona
legislature apparently overruled Schoneberger. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205
(Supp. 2011) (authorizing arbitration of trust matters).
126. 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App. 2011) (en banc).
127. Id. at 311-12.
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require consideration and "can be created without the beneficiary's
28
participation."1
But none of these courts has considered whether the FAA,
rather than a state arbitration statute, governs arbitration clauses in
wills and trusts. If the FAA applies to estate plans, then the "national
policy favoring arbitration"' 129 could transform probate dispute
resolution. The Article turns now to that question.
II. THE FAA AND TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
Section 2, the FAA's centerpiece, states that a "written provision
in... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.""13 Thus, section 2 seems to make
arbitration clauses enforceable as a matter of federal law if three
conditions are met. First, there must be a "contract." Second, within
this "contract" must be an arbitration clause ("[a] written provision
... to settle by arbitration a controversy") that does not violate

contract law ("grounds... for the revocation of any contract"). Third,
the arbitration clause must be part of "a transaction involving
commerce."
This Part argues that some arbitration clauses in wills and trusts
satisfy these criteria. First, although Congress likely intended to limit
the FAA to arbitration clauses in "contract[s]," the Supreme Court
has interpreted this phrase loosely. As a matter of federal common
law, the FAA hinges on whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate,
not whether there is a "contract" in which the arbitration clause
appears. In turn, wills and trusts are capable of giving rise to
agreements to arbitrate; indeed, no one can be bound to the terms of
a testamentary instrument against his wishes. Second, despite the fact
the FAA requires arbitration clauses to comply with "grounds ... for

the revocation of any contract," this prong does not bar testamentary
arbitration. Rather, it merely requires courts to decide whether
128. Id. at 311. Justice Murphy's dissent noted that the Texas arbitration statute does
not apply only to "contracts" but rather governs "written agreement[s] to arbitrate." Id. at
313 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)
(West 2011)). Because the term "agreement" is broader than "contract," Justice Murphy
reasoned that the trust should have fallen within the statute. Id. at 313-15. The concept of
testamentary agreements to arbitrate in the context of the FAA is discussed infra Part
lI.A.2.b.
129. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
130. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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testamentary agreements to arbitrate violate traditional contract
rules. Third, because estate plans are the catalyst for a massive
amount of wealth to be managed and distributed, they are
"transaction[s] involving commerce."
To be clear, this Section does not argue that testamentary
arbitration clauses inexorably fall under the FAA. Indeed, a
subsequent section explores the limits of probate arbitration. The
argument here is simply that arbitration provisions in wills and trusts
are not categorically incompatible with the statute.
A.

"Contract"

The Court often declares that "arbitration is a matter of
contract."13' 1 The FAA's text seems to bear out that statement.
Section 2 makes arbitration clauses in "contract[s]" presumptively
valid.132 Also, the arbitration clause (the "written provision ... to
settle by arbitration a controversy") cannot violate traditional
contract law ("grounds ... for the revocation of any contract"). 33
And as the first subpart of this section reveals, the FAA's legislative
history elucidates that Congress considered-but did not pass-a
draft of the statute that would have applied to "transactions": a
broader term than "contract[s]."' 134 Congress' decision to narrow the
FAA suggests that it expected courts to take the statute's reference to
"contract[s]" at face value.
Yet the Court has also described the statute as facilitating goals
that do not require an arbitration clause to be moored within a
"contract" or to be a "contract" itself. For instance, the Court often
justifies its decisions on the ground that arbitration leads to
"streamlined proceedings and expeditious results"' 35 : values that have
131. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Granite Rock
Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2856 (2010); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 537 U.S. 79,
83 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
132. 9 U.S.C. § 2.

133. Id. This language covers pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Section 2 also refers
separately to post-dispute submissions to arbitration as "an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy." Id. Like pre-dispute arbitration clauses, these postdispute submissions must comply with "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Id.
134. See infra notes 141-42.
135. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
(1985); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 ("The point of affording parties discretion

in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored
to the type of dispute."); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357 (2008) ("A prime objective of

an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results."
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nothing to do with contract law. In fact, as the second part of this
Section illuminates, the Court permits arbitration to occur if the
parties have agreed to arbitrate-no matter whether their agreement
appears in a "contract." In turn, this leniency about "contract[s]" and
the similarity between contracts and estate plans has laid the
foundation for probate arbitration under the FAA.
1. Congressional Intent
Congress likely did not intend for the FAA to govern arbitration
clauses in wills and trusts. For one, the statute's legislative history
repeatedly underscores the link between arbitration and contracts. To
cite just a few examples, the Report of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee describes arbitration clauses as "purely matters of
contract" and states that the FAA seeks to place arbitration clauses
"upon the same footing as other contracts. 13 6 Likewise, the words
"merchant" or "businessman" appear on nearly every page of the
congressional record, reinforcing the fact that the FAA was designed
primarily to govern commercial contracts.137
Conversely, probate arbitration arises only tangentially in the
legislative history. For instance, during the 1923 Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee hearing on the statute, Senator Bernheimer, chairman
of the Arbitration Committee of the New York Chamber of
Commerce, testified:
Arbitration is the time-honored method for the disposition of
all business disputes and controversies and was recognized as
such by the Father of our Country when he made his last will
and testament-the largest single contract he had ever made,
the disposition of all his earthly belongings by means of a single
document ....Fully realizing the wisdom of all of his ways, is
not then Congress merely striving to emulate the example of
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588
(2008) (citing "arbitration's essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway").
136. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; see also Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926) (describing
arbitration under the FAA as "peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes
between merchants as to questions of fact-quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance
with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like").
137. See, e.g., Schwartz, Big Business, supra note 9, at 77 ("The FAA's legislative
history is filled with statements that the purpose of the Act was to settle disputes between
'businessmen.' "); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A
Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedurein Need of Congressional
Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1148 (2002) ("The legislative history is inundated with
references to businessmen or merchants.").
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George Washington by giving our land a law which will make
written agreements voluntarily entered into valid, enforcible
[sic], and irrevocable?'3 8
Even though Bernheimer refers to wills as "contract[s]," it would be
far-fetched to interpret his statement as anything other than
rhetorical puffery. Indeed, he mentions George Washington merely
to drive home the point that arbitration has a venerable history.139
And there is no other express support in the legislative record for
applying the FAA to wills and trusts.
The FAA's drafting history also suggests that it governs
"contracts." This analysis begins with a seemingly contrary point: as
initially written, the statute probably did apply to testamentary
instruments. Recall that section 2 covers arbitration clauses in "[1]
any maritime transaction or [2] a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce."' 4 ° The version of section 2 that Congress
debated in 1923 contained an additional component. It covered
arbitration clauses in "any [1] contract or [2] maritime transaction or
[3] transactioninvolving commerce."''
Arguably, some estate plans-those that involved testators or
settlors, executors or trustees, and beneficiaries from different
states-would have fallen into this third category. First, they would
have been "transactions." Courts had defined that word to be
"broader than 'contract,' " explaining that a "[c]ontract is a
transaction, but a transaction is not necessarily a contract."' 42 Indeed,
"transaction" was a term of art that included the "management of any
matter"'4 3 and would have included a testator or settlor's property use

138. Hearingon S. 4213 and S. 4214, supra note 2, at 3.
139. Id.

140. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
141. Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis added). The statute's

legislative history contains other references to this three-part structure. For example,
Senator Sterling began the 1923 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings by describing the
bill that became the FAA as applying to "contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce
among the [sitates." Id. at 1. A year later, during the Joint Hearings before the Senate and
House Judiciary Subcommittees, Senator Sterling likewise described the proposed statute
as validating "contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the [s]tate[s]." Joint
Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, supra note 55, at 1.
142. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 109 A. 743, 744 (N.J. Ct.

Err. & App. 1920). Indeed, the draft statute itself made that distinction, purporting to
cover "transaction[s]" that were not "contracts." Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646,
supra note 55, at 1.
143. Courtney v. Courtney, 129 N.W. 52, 53 (Iowa 1910) (internal quotation marks
omitted); cf Anderson v. Caulk, 5 S.W.2d 816, 821 (Tex. App. 1928) (quoting Webster's

2012]

FAA AND TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS

1053

and distribution decisions. Second, estate plans with parties from
different states might have "involve[d] commerce" as the phrase was
then understood. Admittedly, in the early 1920s, Congress's
Commerce Clause power was a shadow of what it is today.'" For
instance, in 1913, the Court had determined that insurance policies
were not "articles of commerce"-even when they were brokered
across jurisdictional lines-because "[t]hey are not commodities to be
shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and then put up for
'
sale."145
But a decade later, the Court undercut that logic by
upholding federal regulation of grain futures.146 These futures were
not commercial goods; rather, like wills and trusts, they were legal
instruments that set forth rights and duties relating to property.
Because Congress was aware of its rising Commerce power, it could
have viewed estate plans that featured parties from different states as
"transactions involving commerce" in 1923.117
This point matters because, in 1924, before Congress passed the
FAA, it changed "any contract or maritime transaction or transaction
involving commerce" to "any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce."'148 Congress thus
deleted the independent category of "transactions involving
commerce." It did so for two reasons. First, the original version of
section 2 purported to regulate "any contract"-even "contract[s]"
that did not "involve commerce.' 1 49 As several courts noted later, that
would have been impermissible: "Congress ha[s] no power to legislate
with respect to the validity of contracts" that lack a nexus to interstate
commerce.15 ° Combining "any contract" and "transactions involving
Dictionary for proposition that "transaction" means "[t]he doing or performance of any
business; management of any affair; performance").
144. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (voiding federal statute
that prohibited the interstate shipment of goods made by child labor on the grounds that
manufacturing "is a matter of local regulation").
145. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495, 503 (1913) (quoting Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868)).
146. See Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1923). The Court foreshadowed the
explosive growth of the Commerce Clause during the New Deal by explaining that it
would "not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation
of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent." Id. at
37 (quoting Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922)).
147. The House Report on the FAA implies as much, stating that federal "control over
interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of goods but
also contracts relating to interstate commerce." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
148. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,273,279 (1995).
149. See id.
150. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944); see
also Int'l Union United Furniture Workers of Am. v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co.,
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commerce" remedied this flaw. Second, the amendment's sponsor,
Senator Walsh, wanted to narrow the statute's ambit. Senator Walsh
had long opposed the expansion of federal jurisdiction, which at the
time was perceived to favor corporate interests.15 ' By eliminating
"any contract," he ensured that the FAA would not apply when
federal courts were sitting in diversity and dealing with a contract that
152
did not involve interstate commerce.
More importantly, the Walsh amendment also clarifies that, in
1925, Congress likely believed that the FAA excluded wills and trusts.
Indeed, the only "transactions" that fall under the revised statute
must either (1) relate to admiralty or (2) be "contract[s]." The fact
that Congress narrowed the FAA to exclude all other
"transactions"-and by extension testamentary instrumentssuggests that it expected courts to interpret the word "contract"
literally. Nevertheless, as explained next, the Court has done precisely
the opposite.
2. Federal Common Law
As even some Justices have admitted, the Court has expanded
the FAA beyond what Congress envisioned in order to reap
arbitration's benefits.'53 One way the Court has done so is by
168 F.2d 33, 37 (4th Cir. 1948) ("This was doubtless done in recognition of the lack of
power in Congress to legislate generally with respect to the validity of contracts."). The
Court later endorsed this analysis. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 279 (explaining that
lawmakers could have "thought the words 'any contract' standing alone went beyond
[their] constitutional authority").
151. See Schwartz, supra note 24, at 21-22 (describing Senator Walsh as a "progressive
politician and former plaintiffs' lawyer" who "consistently supported legislation to curtail
federal diversity jurisdiction").
152. The Walsh amendment is critical to the debate over whether Congress intended
the FAA to preempt state law. David Schwartz has argued that section 2's original
language, including its bare reference to "any contract," reveals that the statute was a
procedural law that would only apply in federal court. See id. at 22 n.109. After all,
Congress could regulate "any contract" in federal court under its Article III powers but
not in state court under the Commerce Clause. Although the Walsh amendment then
deleted "any contract," Schwartz argues that Walsh's changes-given his political
orientation-could only have been understood as an effort to further narrow the FAA.
See id. at 22. On the other hand, Christopher Drahozal has noted that Congress may not
have read the Walsh amendment as a substantive change. See Drahozal, supra note 55, at
143 n.243 (noting that Senator Sterling said that the amendment offers "a little different
phraseology, but the purport is just the same as the language in the original bill" (quoting
66 CONG. REC. 2761 (1925))). Without wading into this debate, for this Article's purposes
the relevant point is that the Walsh amendment very well may have changed the FAA's
coverage by excluding "transactions involving commerce" that are not "contracts" (such
as testamentary instruments).
153. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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adopting a soft-focus view of the statute's contract-related
elements." 4 This Section explains why the Court's approach has set
the stage for testamentary arbitration. It makes two main points.
First, rather than insisting that an arbitration clause appear in a
"contract," federal common law predicates the FAA's applicability
on the narrower issue of whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate.
Second, testamentary instruments create reciprocal consensual
relationships and thus can give rise to agreements to arbitrate.
a.

Underlying "Contract"

Recall that several courts applying state law have refused to
compel arbitration of claims brought by beneficiaries against trustees
because testamentary instruments are "not contracts."1'55 These cases
focus on the formalistic differences between estate plans and
contracts: the fact that beneficiaries offer neither "consent [n]or
' However, these
consideration to achieve the status of beneficiary."156
decisions straddle a major fissure between state and federal
arbitration law. In stark contrast to state arbitration statutes, the
FAA as interpreted by the Court does not require that an arbitration
clause appear in an overarching contract.
Consider the separability doctrine. As noted, the separability
rule transforms arbitration clauses into their own freestanding minicontracts within larger container contracts.157 If a party alleges that
the arbitration clause is invalid under a defense such as fraud, duress,
or unconscionability, the court decides the matter.5 8 However,
subject to qualifications discussed below, if a party merely challenges
the enforceability of the container contract, the arbitrator resolves the
claim.159 In the latter circumstance, the case proceeds to arbitration
without regard to whether there actually is a valid contract in which
the arbitration clause is embedded. In fact, the Court recently offered
a textual explanation for this result, observing that section 2 "states
154. For a thoughtful, broader critique of the Court's application of contract principles
in the arbitration context, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric Versus Reality in
Arbitration Jurisprudence:How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks Contracts, 75 LAW

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 132-33 (2012) (calling the Court's views "so alien to actual
contract law as to defy the recurring assurances that arbitration is fundamentally about
contracts or contract law").
155. E.g., Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 257 P.3d
1129, 1129 (Cal. 2011).
156. Id.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
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that a 'written provision' 'to settle by arbitration a controversy' is
'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' without mention of the validity of
the contract in which it is contained."' 160
Buckeye Check Cashing,Inc. v. Cardegna 61 vividly illustrates this
point. The plaintiffs took out payday loans that included an
arbitration clause. Later, they sued the lender, accusing it of charging
usurious interest rates. 162 If the plaintiffs were correct, the loans were
illegal and therefore void ab initio (they never actually came into
existence).' 6 3 Seizing on this fact, the plaintiffs argued that mandating
arbitration would violate section 2, which governs arbitration clauses
in "contracts," not failed, phantom agreements." 64 The Court
' 65
disagreed, reasoning that "[w]e do not read 'contract' so narrowly.'
As the Court explained, section 2's reference to "contract[s]" includes
"putative" contracts "that later prove to be void."'' 66 Thus, without
first establishing that the arbitration clause was anchored in a
contract, the Court ordered arbitration.
Moreover, even outside of the separability doctrine, lower
federal courts have not insisted that an arbitration clause appear in a

contract. For example, in Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,67 the
Eighth Circuit compelled arbitration of an employee's civil rights
160. Rent-A-Center W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) (quoting 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2006)). This reading of section 2 conveniently ignores the savings clause, which states
that the arbitration clause must be consistent with traditional contract law ("such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"). Id. at 2777 n.1. That
omission allows the Court to sidestep the fact that under black letter law-and therefore
under the plain language of section 2--contracts and their terms rise and fall together.
Indeed, if a contract is invalid, all of its provisions are also invalid. See, e.g., Lemire v.
Haley, 19 A.2d 436, 439 (N.H. 1941) ("By great prevalence of authority an invalid or
unenforceable part of an entire contract bars any recovery on the other part of the
contract."). In an influential and insightful article, Alan Rau has defended the separability
doctrine on the grounds that it is "facile to assume a priori that defects in the main
agreement must vitiate the arbitration clause." Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really
Need To Know About "Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions,14 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 1, 27 (2003). But this "facile ... assum[ption]" is a dead-on description of orthodox
contract law-which section 2 expressly requires courts to apply. See, e.g., Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration Law's Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 123, 127 (2007) ("My research revealed no cases in which
courts held that a misrepresentation [or duress] only prevented enforcement of some of
the contract's terms.").
.161. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
162. Id. at 442.
163. Id. at 443.
164. Brief for Respondent at 2-3, Buckeye, 546 U.S. 440 (No. 04-1264), 2005 WL
2376814, at *2.
165. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448.
166. Id.
167. 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
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claim against her former employer.168 The court did so even though
the arbitration clause the employer sought to invoke appeared in an
employee handbook, which was not a contract under state law. 169 In
fact, the handbook expressly provided that it was "not intended to
constitute a legal contract" and that "no written statement or
agreement in this handbook concerning employment is binding." 170
The court looked past these obstacles and concluded that "the
171
arbitration clause stands alone.
Similarly, in Metro East Center for Conditioning & Health v.
Qwest Communications,"' Qwest, a telephone carrier, placed an
arbitration clause in its tariff with the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"). Qwest sought to compel arbitration of a
dispute with Metro East. 73 The district court denied the motion,
reasoning that tariffs-regulatory filings to which customers never
affirmatively agree-are not contracts.174 The Seventh Circuit
reversed, reasoning that the FAA simply requires "an offer and
acceptance that produces a legally binding document."17' 5 According
to the Seventh Circuit, tariffs result from such a process:
The tariff is an offer that the customer accepts by using the
product ....Metro East supposes that to form an "agreement"
with Qwest it must engage in individual negotiation, clause by
clause. A tariff is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition and thus not
an "agreement" by these lights. Yet we have held that form
contracts, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis, are agreements
176
for purposes of the [FAA].

168. Id. at 835.
169. See id. ("Under Missouri law, employee handbooks generally are not considered
contracts, because they normally lack the traditional prerequisites of a contract.").
170. Id.
171. Id.; cf. Ex parte Beasley, 712 So. 2d 338, 341 (Ala. 1998) (reaching the opposite
conclusion where a handbook contained an arbitration clause but an employee signed a
separate acknowledgement form that did not contain an arbitration clause).
172. 294 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2002).
173. Id. at 926.
174. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 182 F. Supp.
2d 726, 729 (S.D. I11.
2002) ("In this case, there was no contract between Qwest and Metro
East. The arbitration clause at issue is contained in a tariff filed with the FCC. The
unilateral and nonnegotiable nature of a tariff filed with the FCC negates any contention
that a tariff constitutes an 'agreement' between parties.").
175. Metro E., 294 F.3d at 926.
176. Id. (citations omitted). Oddly, the Seventh Circuit framed the issue as whether the
tariff satisfied section 3 of the FAA, not section 2. See id. Section 3 states that federal
district courts must grant a stay of litigation "[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought ...
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006). Section 3 thus uses the broader term "agreement," not
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Because Metro East had used Qwest's services, the court determined
that Metro East had agreed to arbitrate. 177
Finally, the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Rent-A-Center
West, Inc. v. Jackson'78 reveals another way in which the FAA does

not require that an arbitration clause appear in a separate "contract."
In that case, Rent-A-Center made employees sign a freestanding
document entitled "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims."' 79 The
Court held that this "arbitration agreement and nothing more"' 8 ° fell
under section 2.111 Similarly, other judges have also enforced bare
contracts to arbitrate even though there is no independent document
18
in which the arbitration clause appears. 1
Accordingly, the fact that state law insists that an arbitration
clause appear in a "contract" is irrelevant for the purposes of the
FAA. As discussed below, the test for whether the FAA applies is

looser and fuzzier: whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate. And
wills and trusts are as capable of giving rise to agreements to arbitrate

as illegal loans, non-binding employment handbooks, and FCC tariffs.
b.

Agreement To Arbitrate

What explains separability cases like Buckeye, in which courts
compel arbitration despite the fact that there may be no "contract" in
which the arbitration clause appears? Leading arbitration scholars

argue that the separability doctrine hinges on a relatively
straightforward concept: "the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate."' 83 According to this view, the Court's binary, bright-line
the narrower term "contract." Cf 9 U.S.C. § 2 (purporting to make arbitration clauses in
"contract[s]" enforceable). Yet given the fact that the court also referred to tariffs as "a
species of contract," it appears that this nuance did not affect the outcome. Metro E., 294
F.3d at 926.
177. Metro E., 294 F.3d at 926.
178. 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010).
179. Id. at 2775.
180. Id. at 2781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2777-80 (majority opinion). The Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims
contained a "delegation clause," which entrusted the arbitrator with determining the very
question of whether the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims was enforceable. See id. at
2776. Invoking the separability doctrine, the Court conceptualized the delegation clause as
an independent arbitration clause ("an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning
the arbitration agreement") within a broader contract to arbitrate (the Mutual Agreement
to Arbitrate Claims). Id. at 2777. As a result, the Court held that employees could not
challenge the validity of the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims in court; rather, the
delegation clause required them to arbitrate that issue. See id. at 2779-80.
182. See, e.g., Morris v. Homeowners Loan Corp., No. 06-CV-13484-DT, 2007 WL
674770, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2007).
183. Rau, supra note 160, at 15.
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description of separability-that it permits judges to decide
challenges to the arbitration clause, but not the container
contract'14-is a gross oversimplification. Suppose a party contends
that she is a minor, or lacks capacity, or reasonably did not believe
that she was even entering into a binding deal. In those instances,
even though the party argues that the container contract is
unenforceable, her allegation also imperils the arbitration clause. 8 '
Indeed, the gravamen of her assertion is that she could not legally
consent to anything, including arbitration.'86 Thus, despite the Court's
rhetoric, judges should resolve claims that revolve around the
" 'nonexistence' of the agreement to arbitrate itself"; 87 indeed, the
188
Court has never squarely held otherwise.
However, this principle has an important corollary: if both
parties are capable of offering legally cognizable assent, it is possible
that they did agree to have the arbitrator decide whether the
container contract is valid. 89 The very point of an arbitration clause is
to permit arbitrators to settle all controversies between the parties,
and the enforceability of the container contract is such a
controversy. 9 ° As a result, any time a party attacks the container
contract under a defense such as fraud, duress, or mistake, the
question arises: did the parties mean to entrust that matter to the
arbitrator? This is where the separability doctrine kicks in. Courts
rarely have evidence about whether the parties intended to submit
disputes about the validity of the container contract to arbitration.
Thus, they must fall back on a default rule.'9 1 And that is exactly what
the separability doctrine is: a federal common law background
principle that infers that the parties wish to arbitrate all matters
relating to the container contract, including its susceptibility to a

184. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center W., Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2778 ("If a party challenges the
validity ... of the precise agreement to arbitrate at issue, the federal court must consider
the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement."); Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (distinguishing between
"challenges specifically [to] the validity of the agreement to arbitrate" and "challenges [to]
the contract as a whole").
185. Rau, supra note 160, at 14.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 15.
188. Cf. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2858 (2010)
(opining that judges must decide issues that pertain to the "formation of the parties'
arbitration agreement"). This issue is discussed in further depth infra notes 310-22.
189. See Rau, supra note 160, at 18-21.
190. See id. at 32.
191. See id. at 29.

1060

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

traditional contract defense. 1" As Alan Rau contends, this implicit
agreement to arbitrate "is no more a 'fiction' than is our usual
assumption that a seller has promised to deliver merchantable
goods." 193 At bottom, then, separability boils down to whether there

is an agreement to arbitrate, with "agreement" defined the same way
'
it is "use[d] ... every day in the realm of contract."194
At first blush, this default presumption of arbitrability seems to
provide a hook for testamentary arbitration. If the mere existence of
an arbitration clause in a contract suggests that the parties have
agreed to arbitrate all disputes about the contract, then perhaps the
same holds true for estate plans. Nevertheless, that argument
overlooks a key difference between the contractual and testamentary
domains. Parties to a purported contract have, at minimum,
manifested assent to the purported contract-an action that can be
seen as the source of their pact to arbitrate disputes related to the
document's validity. Yet recall the limits of this principle: courts
cannot imply an agreement to arbitrate when one party alleges that
she never actually agreed to the contract. As discussed in greater
depth below, many probate litigants make precisely such a claim with
respect to wills and trusts. For example, if an omitted heir contends
that an entire trust was obtained by undue influence, there is simply
no basis to deem him to have acquiesced to any part of the
instrument. He is no more bound by the trust than he is by a contract
between two strangers. Thus, the default rule approach to contractual
separability-the idea that the mere existence of an arbitration clause
in a document triggers a finding that the parties have agreed to
arbitrate disputes about that document-does not translate neatly
into the realm of decedents' estates.
At the same time, though, some parties to an estate plan engage
in affirmative conduct that manifests their assent to arbitrate. Indeed,
192. See id. at 29-34; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract
and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (2011) (calling separability "a default rule

for allocation of authority" between courts and arbitrators). A detailed critique of this
perspective is outside the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the
separability doctrine can be classified as a default rule. Default rules supply terms to
existing agreements-they do not create agreements out of whole cloth. Thus, to use
Professor Rau's example, the implied warranty of merchantability requires sellers to
deliver quality goods but does not require sellers to deliver goods in the first instance.
Rau, supra note 160, at 29-34. Conversely, the separability doctrine does something that
no default rule does: it binds parties together who otherwise would not be bound. Cf.
Ware, supra note 160, at 123 n.107 ("Rules about what constitutes an enforceable contract
cannot be default rules because they are logically prior to the concept of 'default rule.' ").
193. Rau, supra note 160, at 29.
194. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
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sometimes a contract that contains an arbitration clause expires, but
the parties continue to act as though it governs their relationship.
Because the FAA only mandates that arbitration clauses be
"written"-not signed 9 5-courts hold that the parties entered into an
implied-in-fact contract to arbitrate.'96 As the Third Circuit explained,

the arbitration provision "survive[s] intact unless either one of the
parties clearly and manifestly indicates ... that it no longer wishes to
'
continue to be bound."197
Likewise, a robust equitable estoppel
doctrine emanates from the FAA. It prevents parties from asking

judges to honor "specific terms of [an] agreement while seeking to
' In fact, courts have applied this
avoid [its] arbitration provision."198
principle to bind a decedent's heirs and beneficiaries to an arbitration

clause in the decedent's pension, health plan, or retirement
account.'99 The reasoning in these cases-that the arbitration clause
195. See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he FAA
requires arbitration agreements to be written, [but] it does not require them to be
signed."); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987) ("It is
established that a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate even in the absence of
his signature.").
196. Implied-in-fact contracts are "based on a tacit promise, one that is inferred in
whole or in part from the parties' conduct." Gem Broad., Inc. v. Minker, 763 So. 2d 1149,
1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity
Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (en banc)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A promise ...may be inferred

wholly or partly from conduct."). For implied-in-fact agreements to arbitrate, see Luden's
Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, 28 F.3d 347, 356 (3d Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Long
John Silver's Restaurants, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 656, 664 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Durkin v.
CIGNA Property & Casualty Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481, 487 (D. Kan. 1996); Kropfelder v.
Snap-On Tools Corp., 859 F. Supp. 952, 955 (D. Md. 1994).
197. Luden's, 28 F.3d at 355-56; cf Williamsbridge Manor Nursing Home v. Local 144
Div. of 1199, Nat'l Health & Human Servs. Emp'rs Union, 107 F. Supp. 2d 222, 226 (2000)
(rejecting the rule in Luden's in the context of a collective bargaining agreement).
198. S.W. Tex. Pathology Assocs. v. Roosth, 27 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. App. 2000); see
also Wash. Mut. Fin. Grp. LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
FAA's version of equitable estoppel prohibits parties from "having it both ways" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Most courts have construed this rule not to be an extension of
state contract principles but rather part of the "federal substantive law of arbitrability."
R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass'n, 384 F.3d 157, 160 n.1 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Int'l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GmbH, 206 F.3d
411, 416 (4th Cir. 2000)).
199. See Shahan v. Staley (In re Shahan Irrevocable and Inter Vivos Trust), 932 P.2d
1345, 1348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a "trust beneficiary[] was the intended
third-party beneficiary of the customer agreement between the trust and [the trustee]");
Collins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 561 So. 2d 952, 955 (La. Ct. App.
1990) (binding "the successors and assigns of the customer" to arbitration clause in
financial services agreement). But see Clark v. Clark, 57 P.3d 95, 99 (Okla. 2002)
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survives the signatory's death and governs her "intended
successors" 20 0-applies with full force to arbitration provisions in
estate plans. And as one court noted, "[d]ecedents are able to bind
their heirs through wills and other testamentary dispositions so the
concept is not new or illogical." '0 1
As in these contexts, parties to an estate plan can agree to
arbitrate by accepting benefits under the terms of an instrument that
contains an arbitration clause. Consider the inter vivos trust. A settlor
transfers property to a trustee to manage for the settlor's benefit
during life, and then for the beneficiaries after the settlor dies. In the
written trust instrument, the settlor agrees to pay the trustee's fee in
return for the trustee's promise to manage the corpus as instructed.
Because the settlor dictates the terms and the trustee can either
accept or decline them, their "relationship is ... contractual. ' 20 2 For
instance, in the nineteenth century, the great legal historian Frederic
Maitland explained that trusts revolve around agreement:
Why at all events should not the courts of law treat this bargain
as a contract? An agreement there certainly is. In consideration
of a conveyance made by A to X, Y, Z, the said X, Y, Z, agree
that they will hold the land for the behoof of A, will allow him
to enjoy it, and will convey it as he shall direct .... [A] trust
generally has its origin in something that we can not [sic] but
call an agreement.2 3
Decades later, a California appellate court echoed this view:
A declaration of trust constitutes a contract between the trustor
and the trustee for the benefit of a third party. The trustor
declares that he will transfer certain property to a trustee if the
trustee agrees to use and dispose of the property and its
proceeds in a manner designated by the trustor for the benefit

(arbitration clause signed by trustee did not apply to residual beneficiary, who was
unaware of its existence).
200. Jansen v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 776 A.2d 816, 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001); see also Smith Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775 So. 2d 722, 727 (Miss. 2001) ("As a
successor of Hilliard, Henry is covered by the arbitration clause of the client
agreements.").
201. Herbert v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477, 481 (Ct. App. 1985).
202. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 643 (2004).
203. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 28 (John Brunyate rev. ed.,
1936).
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of third parties. There is in this situation an offer by the trustor
and an acceptance by the trustee. °
And more recently, John Langbein has argued that trusts are "deals"
between the settlor and trustee because they feature the "bedrock
elements" of contract: "consensual formation and consensual
terms.

25

°

Similarly, when an individual accepts the position of executor
under a will that contains an arbitration provision, she too agrees to
arbitrate. Indeed, "[y]ou cannot be appointed executor of a will
against your wishes."2 6 To be sure, wills differ from inter vivos trusts
because the testator will be dead when the person named as executor
must decide whether to serve. In contract law, the death of an offeror
usually revokes an offer.2 °7 Yet the basis for this rule is that once the
offeree knows about the offeror's demise, the offeree can no longer
reasonably rely on the offer. 2 8 This rationale does not apply to
"offers" embedded in estate plans, which are specifically intended to
remain open after death. 2 9 And indeed, the law recognizes the
normative significance of the fact that trusteeship and executorship
are voluntary. Once a trustee or executor assumes her role, she
accepts-and is bound by-all of an instrument's terms.210 There is no
reason to treat an arbitration clause differently.2 l
204. In re Estate of Bodger, 279 P.2d 61, 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955). But see Diaz v.
Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2011), opinion vacated by 257 P.3d 1129, 1129
(Cal. 2011) (disapproving of Bodger and calling its discussion dicta).
205. John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 671 (1995). Testamentary trusts, which arise out of wills, likewise are "consensual," as
"[t]he testamentary trustee decides whether to accept the trust on the terms contained in
the instrument and in the background default law of trusts." Id. at 637. The only noncontractual form of trust is the declaration of trust in which the settlor declares that she
holds property as trustee for the benefit of others. After all, "[t]he settlor cannot contract
with himself or herself." Id. at 627. Yet the declaration of trust plays a minor role in
modern estate planning. Id. at 628.
206. Id. at 637 (noting that wills "exhibit[] the twin features of contractarianismconsensual formation and consensual terms").
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 (1981).

208. See Val D. Ricks, The Death of Offers, 79 IND. L.J. 667,686 (2004).
209. In addition, this Article will return to the issue of whether arbitration clauses in
estate plans must satisfy the black letter test for contractual validity infra Part II.A.2.c.
210. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003) (noting that the testator or settlor's intent as specified in
the instrument controls); see also In re Estate of Bodger, 279 P.2d 61, 67-68 (Cal. Ct. App.
1955) (drawing on contract principles to hold that courts lack the power to override the
trustee's fee as stated in the instrument).
211. To be sure, wills are less contractual than trusts in other ways, too. Unlike
contracts, which are private, wills generally must be lodged with the clerk of court,
available for all to see. Also, the administration of a testator's estate under a will is usually
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Likewise, when beneficiaries inherit under an estate plan, they
forge a contract-like link with the testator or settlor. For one,
beneficiaries usually enjoy several months to decide whether to
disclaim a bequest.2 12 In addition, beneficiaries remain free to
challenge the validity of a will or trust-conduct that is incompatible
with the idea that they have consented to the instrument. Thus,
beneficiaries have the opportunity to opt out of the arrangement
proposed by the testator or settlor. As in the expired contract cases,
when they do not do so, their "assent [to arbitrate] may fairly be
'
inferred."2 13
The nineteenth century opinions that analogized
arbitration clauses in estate plans to conditional gifts are
instructive. 214 As these courts recognized, a will or trust with an
arbitration clause puts beneficiaries to an election: either renounce
the gift or take it subject to the strings attached. This choice is
indistinguishable from an offer to enter into a contract. For instance,
as the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained, a
testamentary instrument may not formally be "an agreement between
two or more contracting parties, but it is certainly no less binding
upon the parties who take a benefit under it than if they had
' 215
contracted with the testator for that benefit.
In sum, wills and trusts can serve as the springboard for
agreements to arbitrate. To be sure, estate plans do not involve
bargaining; likewise, executors, trustees, and beneficiaries assent to
the instrument by failing to denounce it, rather than by affirmatively
selecting its provisions. Yet courts routinely enforce adhesive
consumer and employment contracts under precisely those

subject to court supervision. Nevertheless, these nuances do not diminish the most
important fact for my purposes: that executorship is voluntary, and executors are deemed
to agree to-and abide by-the terms of the will.
212. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 36(c) (1959). Compare Brodhag

v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 747, 751 (S.D. W. Va. 1970) (stating that a disclaimer must
occur two months after will is admitted into probate), with In re Estate of Meland, 712
N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D. 2006) (stating that a disclaimer must occur within nine months of the
testator or settlor's death).
213. D'Angelo v. Bob Hastings Oldsmobile, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 503, 504 (App. Div.
1982).
214. See supra notes 47-49.
215. Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362, 374 (1886); see also Am. Bd. of Comm'rs of
Foreign Missions v. Ferry, 15 F. 696, 701 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1883) ("The testator had the
legal right to give or not to give, and giving, he had the right to bestow his bounties on
such conditions, and with such limitations and restrictions as he chose to impose."): cf
Spitko, supra note 23, at 299 (arguing that "the testator ought to be able to condition any
distribution of her property on compliance with her reasonable directions respecting
resolution of disputes over her estate").
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conditions. 216 Thus, by accepting benefits-fees or property-under a
will or trust that contains an arbitration clause, executors, trustees,
and beneficiaries fall within the FAA's coverage.
c.

The Savings Clause

Recall that section 2 instructs courts to ensure that arbitration
clauses comply with "such grounds that exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.

'21 7

Even if the FAA does not require

an arbitration clause to appear in a "contract," this savings clause
seems to introduce contract law through the back door: like "any

contract," arbitration clauses cannot fall prey to formation defects
(like lack of assent or indefiniteness) or defenses (such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability). This rubric leads to two
counterarguments to my thesis.
First, recall the state court cases that have refused to enforce
arbitration clauses on the grounds that testamentary instruments do
not involve "an exchange of promises. "218 Although these cases hold
that estate plans are not "contracts," their reasoning can be

refashioned into a different objection to my reading of the statute.
The absence of consideration-a pillar of contract formation-is a
ground for revoking a contract. 219 Technically, wills and trusts law
does not require beneficiaries to provide something of value to any

other party. 220 Thus, perhaps even if estate plans generate agreements
to arbitrate, these agreements lack consideration, rendering them

invalid under the savings clause.
I have several responses. For one, just as the Court has not
interpreted "contract" rigidly, the Court has also disregarded the
216. Cf Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 294 F.3d
924, 926 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument that "individual negotiation, clause by
clause" is a prerequisite for an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA); Langbein, supra
note 205, at 637 (noting that the "deal" between the testator or settlor and the executor or
trustee "is of the take-it-or-leave-it type, like the movie-theater ticket or the vendingmachine contract; there is no negotiating terms with a decedent").
217. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
218. See, e.g., Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004),
superseded by statute, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v.
Fink, No. 1 CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011).
219. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; cf Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011) (en
banc) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in trust because, among other things,
"consideration is ... a fundamental element of every valid contract" (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
220. This Article focuses on beneficiaries because executors and trustees nearly always
engage in conduct that would satisfy the test for consideration: agreeing to manage the
decedent's property in return for the payment of fees out of the estate.
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savings clause when necessary to "promote arbitration."2 21
For
instance, the Court has held that the FAA preempts the longstanding
contract defense of violation of public policy.22 Likewise, the Court
enforced an arbitration provision that did not comply with the savings
clause in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.2 23 The Supreme Court
of California had held that class arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts could be unconscionable because they prevent plaintiffs
from prosecuting numerous low-value claims. 24 But Concepcion held
that the FAA preempted the state supreme court's interpretation of
its own contract law.225 The court reasoned that because class
arbitration is slower and more formal than two-party arbitration,
California's attempt to guarantee such procedures through the
unconscionability doctrine "stand[s] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." 2 6 Thus, literal compliance
with the savings clause is actually not a prerequisite.
With this nudge from federal law, beneficiaries likely come close
enough to providing consideration to satisfy the savings clause. The
notoriously toothless test for consideration simply requires one party
to surrender a legal right in accordance with another party's wishes.22
By forgoing the opportunity to litigate in court in response to the
testator or settlor's request, beneficiaries meet this criterion. As a
general matter, arbitration clauses in estate plans-like all conditional
gifts-"are not true gratuities at all" because, "[l]ike a contract, they
require performance of a quid pro quo." ' 8
Moreover, as discussed above, there is a plausible argument that
wills and trusts are "contracts" for the purposes of the FAA. Indeed,
estate plans seem as contractual as the myriad non-contracts that

221. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
222. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18-20 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
224. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-10 (Cal. 2005),
abrogatedby Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
225. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
226. Id. at 1748. Because the contract at issue contained a "blowup" clause-which
specified that if a court annulled the class arbitration waiver, "the entirety of this
arbitration provision shall be null and void"-there was no dispute that the class
arbitration waiver (and by extension the entire arbitration clause) violated a ground for
the revocation of any contract. Brief for Respondents at 3, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(No. 09-893), 2010 WL 4411292, at *3.Yet, the case did continue to arbitration.
227. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
228. Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract,95 MINN. L. REV.
2180, 2194 (2011).
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have spawned agreements to arbitrate. 229 And when arbitration
provisions are part of a larger contract-or at least what passes for a
"contract" under the FAA-they need not boast their own separately
identifiable consideration. Instead, they can ride the wake of the
consideration that underlies the broader "contract. ' 23 ° Thus,

incompatible
testamentary arbitration provisions are not necessarily
231
with "grounds... for the revocation of any contract.
A second savings clause-related objection is that this Article's
interpretation of the FAA creates an anomaly. The savings clause
permits courts to strike down arbitration clauses under contract

doctrine and only contract doctrine. But extending the statute to
probate matters would create situations in which arbitration clauses
might be invalid under wills and trusts law, not contract law. For

instance, several jurisdictions limit the enforceability of "exculpatory
clauses" in trusts, which they define as terms "relieving a trustee of
liability for breach of trust.

' 23 2

Suppose a trust's arbitration clause

violates this rule by barring awards of consequential or punitive
damages against the trustee. Because the anti-exculpatory clause
doctrine is not a "ground[] ... [to] revok[e] any contract, 2 33 the plain

language of the savings clause seems to preclude a probate judge
from invoking the rule. In turn, this awkward, unpalatable result
reinforces the fact that Congress never meant the FAA to apply to
decedents' estates.
Although I acknowledge that this is a forceful argument, I am

ultimately not persuaded. For starters, the overwhelming majority of
grounds to invalidate an estate plan overlap with contract defenses.
Indeed, both bodies of law recognize rules such as fraud, duress,
229. See supra notes 161-77.
230. For cases holding that an arbitration clause need not be supported by its own
independent consideration, see Harrisv. Green Tree FinancialCorp., 183 F.3d 173, 180 (3d
Cir. 1999); Doctor's Associates., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451-53 (2d Cir. 1995); Wilson
Electric Contractors,Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 168-69 (6th Cir.
1989); Dorsey v. H.C.P.Sales, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 804,807 (N.D. I11.1999).
231. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
232. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(a), 7C U.L.A. 126 (Supp. 2008) (requiring exculpatory
clauses to satisfy heightened disclosure standards and be substantively reasonable if they
were inserted by a fiduciary or its lawyers); see, e.g., Rutanen v. Ballard, 678 N.E.2d 133,
141 (Mass. 1997) (striking down exculpatory clause); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 222, cmt. d (1959) (articulating a six-factor test for the validity of exculpatory
clauses); cf. Ams. for the Arts v. Ruth Lilly Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust, 855
N.E.2d 592, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting challenge to exculpatory clause because
complaining parties "were all represented by numerous sophisticated attorneys who are
experienced in the area of trusts and estate planning").
233. 9 U.S.C. § 2; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18-20 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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incapacity, undue influence, mistake, impossibility, and violation of
public policy.234 And as I have discussed elsewhere, the antiexculpatory clause doctrine in trust law bears a strong resemblance
to-and could easily be replaced by-the contract defense of
unconscionability.2 35 Thus, the fact that the savings clause forbids
judges from invalidating testamentary arbitration clauses under wills
and trusts principles makes almost no practical difference.
In addition, to take the savings clause at face value-as limiting
judges to nullifying arbitration clauses on "grounds ...for the
revocation of any contract" 23 6 ---is to exclude many contract principles.
Only a handful of rules actually govern "any contract." For example,
courts routinely find arbitration clauses to be unenforceable "material
alteration[s]" to offers under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") section 2-207.237 But the UCC does not apply to "any
238
contract"-it only controls contracts for the sale of goods.
Accordingly, it does not make sense to overemphasize the text of the
savings clause, and the mere fact that wills and trusts rules are not
"grounds... for the revocation of any contract ' 23 9 should not be fatal
to testamentary arbitration.24 °
B.

"Involving Commerce"

The FAA governs arbitration clauses in contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce."24' 1 The statute borrows its definition
of "commerce" from the Commerce Clause: "commerce ...among
the several States. '24 2 Thus, in 1995, the Supreme Court held in
Allied-Bruce v. Terminix Cos. 243 that Congress intended the FAA to
extend to the outer perimeter of the Commerce power. 244 But shortly

234. See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME

L. REV. 1675, 1680 (2009).
235. See id. at 1727-31.
236. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
237. See, e.g., Avedon Eng'g, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1283-85 (10th Cir. 1997).
238. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2011).
239. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
240. However, the disconnect between wills and trusts law and contract law does raise
novel preemption issues, which is addressed infra Part III.D.
241. Infra Part III.D.
242. 9 U.S.C § 1. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 ("The Congress shall have power
...[t]o regulate commerce.., among the several states ....
243. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
244. Id. at 277. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that no other federal
statute uses the phrase "involving commerce." See id. at 273-74 (interpreting "involving
commerce" to be the equivalent of "in commerce" or "affecting commerce"); see also
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (foreshadowing the holding in Allied-Bruce by
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afterward, the Court muddied the waters by striking down two
federal statutes for lacking a nexus to interstate commerce. In United
States v. Lopez,2 45 the Court nullified a law that criminalized the
possession of a firearm in a school zone, reasoning that it "has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms. ' 246 Then, in United
States v. Morrison,247 the Court invalidated the civil remedies
provision of the Violence Against Women Act, explaining that
Congress lacks the authority to "regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on [its] aggregate effect on interstate
commerce." 24 8 These cases threw lower courts into disarray over
whether the FAA governed arbitration clauses in wholly intrastate
transactions. 24 9

Recently, in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,25 ° the Court reaffirmed
the FAA's vast scope. 251 A bank and a construction company, both
from Alabama, entered into a loan restructuring contract that
included an arbitration clause.252 Despite the intrastate nature of the
transaction, the Court held that the FAA applied for several reasons.
First, the Court reasoned that even if the agreement at issue did not
substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress can regulate
patently "economic" activity as a "general practice. ' 253 The Court
found that commercial lending, with its heavy impact on the market,
met this criterion and thus was subject to wholesale congressional
control.254 Second, the Court noted that the construction company
had used the loan to fund projects not just in Alabama, but also in
North Carolina and Tennessee. 25 5 Finally, the Court explained that

opining that the FAA "provide[s] for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within
the full reach of the Commerce Clause").
245. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
246. Id. at 561.
247. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
248. Id. at 617.
249. Compare Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759, 76162 (Ala. 2000) (finding that Lopez partially overruled Allied-Bruce), with Basura v. U.S.
Home Corp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328, 333 n.8 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Lopez did not purport to
abrogate, limit or distinguish Allied-Bruce."), and In re Turner Bros. Trucking Co., 8
S.W.3d 370, 375 (Tex. App. 1999) ("The Texas courts of appeals have split on the
issue ....).
250. 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (per curiam).
251. Id. at 56-58.
252. Id. at 53-55.
253. Id. at 56-57.
254. Id. at 58.
255. Id. at 57.
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the loans were secured by the construction company's assets, which
included goods made from out-of-state materials.256
Despite the breadth of Citizens Bank, wills and trusts do not fit

snugly into the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For one, it is
unclear whether the appropriate "transaction" is the creation of the
will or trust or the post-death administration of a decedent's property.
But then again, it may not matter: both estate planning and
administration boast a deep economic footprint. As noted, Americans
bequeath hundreds of billions of dollars annually. 257 Trusts in
particular have become "big business indeed. ' 258 For instance, in
2007, irrevocable trusts alone generated $142.5 billion in income and
$3.7 billion in trustees' fees. 259 These assets are often managed across
state lines. In fact, one of the most debated trends in decedents'
estates has been jurisdictional competition for trust funds.260 Settlors
can opt into the law of any state simply by transferring assets into its
256. Id. After Citizens Bank, successful Commerce Clause-based challenges to the
applicability of the FAA have been few and far between. Some such cases involve unusual
facts. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Stewart Enters., No. C 07-01157, 2007 WL 2255221, at *3, *8
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007) (finding an arbitration clause in crematorium's employment
contract was not "a transaction involving commerce" because the cemetery business is
state-licensed and does not involve products shipped between states); Jim Parker Bldg.
Co. v. G & S Glass & Supply Co., 69 So. 3d 124, 133-34 (Ala. 2011) (noting that the party
seeking enforcement "wholly failed to allege that the contract evidences a transaction
involving interstate commerce .. . [and] failed to even mention the phrase 'interstate
commerce' in its motion to compel arbitration"). At least one other court refused to find a
link to interstate commerce in a nursing home admission contract: a holding that may
reflect distaste over the foisting of arbitration clauses upon vulnerable elders more than
clear-eyed analysis of the Commerce Clause. See Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship,
155 P.3d 16, 31 (Okla. 2006) (explaining that nursing home admission contract "involves a
profoundly local transaction-in-state nursing home care provided to an Oklahoma
individual by an Oklahoma entity licensed under Oklahoma law"). But see Carter v. SSC
Odin Operating Co., 955 N.E.2d 1233, 1240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) ("The [nursing home]
facility's aggregate economic activities clearly have an effect upon interstate commerce
); Estate of
.....
Ruszala v. Brookdale Living Cmtys., Inc., 1 A.3d 806, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2010) ("Clearly these nursing home facilities cannot function without the
materials procured from ...out-of-state suppliers."). For other cases that found that
facilities used out-of-state materials, see Canyon Sudar Partners, LLC v. Cole, No. 3:101001, 2011 WL 1233320, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 29, 2011); Oesterle v. Atria Management
Co., No. 09-4010, 2009 WL 2043492, at *6 (D. Kan. Jul. 14, 2009); Owens v. Coosa Valley
Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 987-88 (Ala. 2004); Triad Health Management of
Georgia, III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787-88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); and Fosler v.
Midwest Care Center II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 15 (I11.
App. Ct. 2009).
257. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
258. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 544.
259. Id.
260. See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1312-16 (2003) (describing the forces that led states to begin to
compete for trust funds).
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borders, and trust management creates lucrative jobs for lawyers,
accountants, and fiduciaries. 26 1 As a result, twenty-six jurisdictions
have abolished or limited the Rule Against Perpetuities in an effort to
seem settlor-friendly.26 2 As Rob Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach have
proven, this maneuvering by state lawmakers has caused settlors to
transfer "roughly $100 billion" in assets between states.263 Given these
staggering figures, the Court might fashion a blanket rule that
testamentary instruments are "transaction[s] involving commerce."
As much as commercial loans, they are part and parcel of a "general
practice" with profound fiscal significance, permitting Congress to
exercise its Commerce prerogative "in individual cases without
showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce.""
A second complication is that wills and trusts can be formed
without consideration. Thus, one might argue that estate plans are not
"economic" because they merely reallocate-rather than createwealth. Yet this claim is unpersuasive. First, the Court has opined that
the bare "distribution" of property is a "quintessentially economic"
activity, 265 and, of course, wills and trusts convey land, cash, stocks,
and heirlooms between generations. Second, it is not uncommon for
Congress to regulate gratuities under the Commerce Clause. At least
two federal statutes impose criminal liability for making gifts in

261. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1065-66 (2000) (describing the ease with which a

settlor can change a trust's situs).
262. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2904 (2005);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-1102.5 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(a) (2009); D.C.
CODE § 19-904 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.225 (West 1994); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 55-111 (2007); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4 (West 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68
(West 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.215 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 101-A (Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 11-102 (LexisNexis
2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-1005 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2005 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.1031 (LexisNexis 2010);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:24 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2003);
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-15
(2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-27.4 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-1 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1-205 (Supp. 2011).
263. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition for Trust

Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359 (2005)
("[O]n average, through 2003 a state's abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities increased
its reported trust assets by about $6 billion and its average trust account size by roughly
$200,000.").
264. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003) (quoting Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
265. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005).
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certain situations. 266 Third, few scholars believe that so-called
"sterile" promises have no financial or pecuniary value.26 7 To the

contrary, "gratuitous transfers frequently involve implicit elements
of
268
exchange" and "rival[] the traditional market in . . . significance.
Finally, even if the Court insisted on specific proof of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, most estate plans would
pass with flying colors. As one district judge recently put it,
"[t]ransactions involving the interstate transfer of money ...and

diverse parties" satisfy the FAA's commerce element. 269 Accordingly,
either naming a single beneficiary who lives out of state or selecting a
fiduciary from another jurisdiction satisfies this test by sending
valuable property across state borders.270 In fact, the threshold may
be lower: some estate plans may "involv[e] commerce" even if the
parties are not diverse. Like the wholly intrastate loans in Citizens
Bank, which were secured by goods made in other states,271 choosing

a local bank or trust company as executor or trustee links the estate
to a web of national relationships. Indeed, as the Third Circuit has
explained, assets held by financial institutions are "constantly moving

266. See, e.g., Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(3) (Supp. 2011)
(outlawing gifts of assets with links to crime); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, §§ 103(a),
104, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2006) (prohibiting gifts made as bribes).
267. The phrase "sterile promise" is usually attributed to Lon L. Fuller, Consideration
and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941) ("While an exchange of goods is a
transaction which conduces to the production of wealth and the division of labor, a gift is
... a 'sterile transmission.'" (quoting CLAUDE BUFNOIR, PROPRItTt ET CONTRAT 487
(2d ed. 1924)). But "even Fuller shied away from relying too heavily on this argument."
David Gamage & Allon Kedem, Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299, 1311 n.30
(2006); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979)
(noting the utility-enhancing functions of gift-giving); Andrew Kull, Reconsidering
Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 49 n.33 (1992) (explaining that few writers
actually claim that promises that lack consideration are "entirely 'sterile' ").
268. Hirsch, supra note 228, at 2182-83.
269. Mitchell v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 4:11cv1581 TCM, 2011 WL 6009658, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2011).
270. See, e.g., Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d 788, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
similarly that "the parties are located in different states ... and the agreement
contemplates the transfer of inventory and money between the states"); Pickering v.
Urbantus, LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00411-JEG-RAW, 2011 WL 6076332, at *3-4 (S.D. Iowa Nov.
23, 2011) (similar); Jenkins v. Atelier Homes, Inc., 62 So. 3d 504, 510 (Ala. 2010) (holding
that a "transaction involved interstate commerce because ...[c]ertain goods, funds, and
documents crossed state lines" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
271. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 539 U.S. 52, 57 (2003) (per curiam).
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2 72 Thus,
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most (if not all) wills and

In sum, federal law does not require an arbitration clause to
appear in a contract. Instead, the FAA applies if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate. When an executor, trustee, or beneficiary accepts
fees or property under an estate plan, they fall within the FAA's
coverage. In addition, they virtually always also satisfy the statute's
final element: the necessity of a "transaction involving commerce. 27 3
In turn, this raises a host of new questions about how the statute
would impact probate. The next Part considers those issues.
III. TESTAMENTARY ARBITRATION UNDER THE FAA
This Part describes how probate arbitration would function
under the FAA. It focuses on four important and controversial
aspects of federal arbitration law: the ambit of the agreement to
arbitrate, the boundaries of the FAA, the separability rule, and
preemption. It does so in an attempt to help courts and policymakers
who may be called upon to assimilate the FAA into probate. In
addition, this Part highlights several reasons why testamentary
arbitration should be less objectionable than consumer and
employment arbitration. In particular, it argues that arbitration
clauses in wills and trusts generate a more meaningful form of
consent than arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, and that gaps
in the FAA's coverage of probate disputes create greater
opportunities for state regulation.
A.

The Scope of the Agreement To Arbitrate

The "presumption in favor of arbitration 2 74 only goes so far. As
shown, courts will bend over backwards to enforce an arbitration
clause if the parties have reached an agreement (even if it is not a
valid "contract"). But this pro-arbitration approach does not apply to
the threshold issue of whether the parties have entered into an
agreement. Indeed, judges are far more receptive to litigants who
contend that they do not fall within the scope of an agreement or its

272. United States v. Spinello, 265 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Brief for
Appellee at 33, Spinello, 265 F.3d 150 (No. 00-3504), 2001 WL 34095074, at *33)
(upholding federal bank robbery statute as a proper exercise of the commerce power).
273. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
274. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401,407 n.2 (2003).

1074

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

arbitration clause.2 75 As several federal appellate courts have
explained, the FAA does not "extend the reach of an arbitration
provision to parties who never agreed to arbitrate in the first
2 76
place.
This subtle distinction helps define the limits of testamentary
arbitration under the FAA. I have argued that the statute should bind
parties to arbitration clauses in wills and trusts if they can be deemed
to consent to the terms of the instrument (usually by accepting
benefits under it). Executors and trustees, who receive their fees from
the estate, should usually meet this standard. As noted, they agree to
arbitrate disputes as much as they agree to manage and distribute the
property according to the testator or settlor's wishes. Similarly, a
beneficiary who attempts to enforce rights that would not exist
without the will or trust manifests her assent to its arbitration clause.
For instance, a beneficiary who brings a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty seeks to hold the executor or trustee to his obligations under the
instrument and thus acquiesces to its other provisions, including its
arbitration clause.
Likewise, some challenges to the validity of an estate plan may
be arbitrable. Suppose the settlor executes a trust that contains an
arbitration clause and leaves her property one-third to her best
friend, one-third to her son, and one-third to her daughter. Now
assume that the son alleges that the daughter obtained her one-third
share through undue influence. Although the son is seeking to
overturn part of the trust, he is also attempting to accept benefits
under the rest of the trust. He should not simultaneously be able to
accept his bequest and disavow the instrument's arbitration clause.
Like any other term in the estate plan, the arbitration clause is a tacit
condition to which the son agrees when he chooses to inherit.
Similarly, if the friend accuses both the son and daughter of undue
influence, she should be bound to arbitrate. Because the friend is not

275. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986) (" '[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit.' " (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 583 (1960))).
276. Grundstad v. Ritt, 106 F.3d 201, 205 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Century Indem.
Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 584 F.3d 513, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
that the "presumption in favor of arbitration" does not apply to "the threshold question as
to the existence of an agreement between the parties to arbitrate"); McCarthy v. Azure, 22
F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that the presumption of arbitrability "does not
extend to situations in which the identity of the parties who have agreed to arbitrate is
unclear"); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[N]o party
can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to so.").
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a blood relative, she would not be able to take anything from the
settlor absent the trust. 77 Thus, any claim she might bring depends on
the instrument's existence. If she wants to accept this gift, she must
also accept the method of dispute resolution specified in the trust.
But the flip side of this principle is that some litigants in probate
cases do not consent to anything in the estate plan, including its
arbitration clause. Consider a variation on the hypothetical above: the
son alleges that the trust is invalid because the settlor lacked mental
capacity. Here, the son is not attempting to reap the advantages of the
instrument while avoiding the burden of the arbitration clause. To the
contrary, he is challenging the trust's very existence.27 8 Just as he does
not agree to the trust's dispositive scheme, he does not assent to
arbitrate his dispute. Likewise, if the mother had omitted the son
from the trust, he could not be bound by an arbitration clause in an
instrument that does not mention him at all.
Admittedly, this necessity of an implicit agreement to arbitrate
may diminish the FAA's usefulness in probate. Testators and settlors
place arbitration clauses in wills and trusts largely to minimize the
expense and delay caused by individuals who are disappointed with
their gifts. But because these disgruntled beneficiaries will often seek
to nullify the instrument-rather than enforce its terms-they cannot
be compelled to arbitrate.
Yet these limits may help probate arbitration under the FAA
achieve the legitimacy that has eluded contractual arbitration. Recall
that some courts and scholars have accused consumer and
employment arbitration of being nonconsensual" 9 Several factors
would diminish these concerns in testamentary arbitration as I have
described it. First, because being named in a testamentary instrument
is a rare event, beneficiaries are more likely to pay attention to
arbitration clauses in estate plans than arbitration clauses in adhesion
contracts. Second, there are at least two ways in which beneficiaries
can opt out of arbitration. For one, they can disclaim their bequests.
State law generally gives beneficiaries several months to make such a
choice, allowing them ample time to weigh their options and even
obtain counsel.28 ° A decision made on that timeline generates a far
277. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigmof Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L.

REV. 199, 201 (2001) (noting that under intestacy statutes, "[d]ecedents and their survivors
remain first and foremost spouses, parents, children, and siblings").
278. Challenges to the validity of a testamentary instrument will raise issues under the
separability doctrine, which is discussed infra Part III.C.
279. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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more robust form of consent than a "bill stuffer" that deems a
consumer to have agreed to arbitrate unless she closes her account
within thirty days.2"' And even if a beneficiary does not disclaim, she
should still be entitled to a judicial forum if the nature of her claimfor example, a challenge to the entire instrument-reveals that she
does not agree to arbitrate. Third, contractual arbitration is
problematic because drafters impose it at the time of contracting,
when most adherents are not thinking about the prospect of litigation
and tend to undervalue their procedural rights.282 Conversely,
beneficiaries are almost always aware at the time of the testator or
settlor's death of the facts that might give rise to an incapacity or
undue influence claim. Accordingly, even those who strongly oppose
the rise and spread of contractual arbitration need not be as wary of
testamentary arbitration.
Similarly, these gaps in the FAA's coverage may assuage
federalism concerns. A second major criticism of the Court's
arbitration jurisprudence is that it constitutes "a permanent,
unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially
'
But because the FAA would not govern
large class of disputes."283
many probate litigants, it would permit states to shape testamentary
arbitration law. For example, state lawmakers would be free to
declare that challenges to an estate plan's validity should be
arbitrable whether or not the plaintiff can be said to agree to the
instrument's terms. In fact, that is exactly what Arizona lawmakers
did in 2008, passing a trust-specific arbitration statute that "allows the
281. Of course, testamentary arbitration will rarely be "consensual" for beneficiaries in
the sense that it springs from an independent, affirmative choice. Because estate plans can
be windfalls-and also deeply symbolic and emotional-hardly anyone will disclaim a
bequest out of pure enmity toward arbitration. Nevertheless, an element of coercion is par
for the arbitration course. As the Seventh Circuit has remarked:
Arbitration often comes with the territory, so to speak-for example, with a job or
with membership in the National Association of Securities Dealers.... Although
these requirements may be non-negotiable-one cannot join the NASD without
accepting its arbitration regimen, and often an investor cannot trade securities
through NASD members without committing to arbitrate-they remain
"agreements" because the person could have chosen to do something else.
Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 294 F.3d 924, 926 (7th
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
283. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of "not honor[ing] federalist principles");
Schwartz, supra note 24, at 5 (calling the Court's reading of the FAA "a major federalism
mistake").
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consent. 2 8 4
imposition of arbitration without beneficiaries'
Regardless of whether the Arizona statute is wise policy, it is
precisely the kind of judgment that states have not been able to make
in the contractual arbitration arena. For these reasons, probate
arbitration under the FAA may avoid some of the flaws that have
made contractual arbitration so polarizing.
B.

The ProbateException and the Boundaries of the FAA

Questions about the FAA's scope are a persistent challenge. This
problem transcends the question of whether the Court has
interpreted the statute more broadly than lawmakers would have
wished. Because the FAA predates the massive expansion of the
federal Commerce power, matters that Congress did not intend to
regulate in 1925 now fall squarely within the statute's text. For
instance, there is strong evidence that lawmakers did not want the
FAA to govern arbitration clauses in insurance contracts; 285 yet, there
is no doubt that the statute's plain language now encompasses those
agreements.28 6 The Court has resolved this issue in case after case by
favoring sweeping literal interpretations of the statute over narrower
constructions grounded in context or legislative history. 87
284. Jones v. Fink, No. 1 CA-SA-10-0262, 2011 WL 601598, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb.
22, 2011); see also ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (2011) ("A trust instrument may
provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the

trustee and interested persons or among interested persons with regard to the
administration or distribution of the trust.").
285. For instance, during the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings on the bill,

Senator Walsh stated: "The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these
contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily things at all. Take an insurance
policy; there is a blank in it. You can take that or you can leave it." Hearingon S. 4213 and
S. 4214, supra note 2, at 9. W. H. H. Piatt, who was then testifying, replied that "it is not
the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases." Id.
286. Currently, certain insurance-related issues do not fall within the FAA because of a
unique federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which reverse-preempts federal law.
Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(2006)). See, e.g., Kremer v. Rural Cmty. Ins. Co., 788 N.W.2d 538, 551 (Neb. 2010)

(discussing this phenomenon). Yet there is no question that insurance policies are
"contract[s] evidencing a transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of FAA
section 2.
287. For instance, section 1 excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Congress inserted this exception in response to objections that the FAA
would govern employment contracts. See Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214, supra note 2, at

14 (quoting a letter from then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover that noted
"objection [s]... to the inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's scheme"). Nevertheless,
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001), the Court ignored the

legislative history and held that section 1 only exempts transportation workers from the
FAA.
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Accordingly, I have argued that the Court would likely find the FAA

to cover arbitration clauses in estate plans even though Congress did
not envision that result.
Nevertheless, this subsection claims that the Court should
recognize a rare implied exception to the FAA. Specifically, the

Court ought to exclude "core probate" matters from the statute's
ambit. Core probate petitions ask a court to (1) supervise the
administration of a testator's estate or (2) invalidate a will (but not a
trust). 288

This carve-out does not merely reflect the mere fact that
Congress enjoyed less power in 1925; rather, it stems from a more
authoritative source: the longstanding probate exception to federal
subject matter jurisdiction. Under the probate exception, federal
courts cannot hear "matters of strict probate," even if they would
otherwise have diversity jurisdiction.289 Most courts and scholars trace
the probate exception to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created
diversity jurisdiction. 29' The Judiciary Act empowered federal courts

to hear "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" if the
parties are from different states and the complaint seeks damages of a
certain amount.29 ' The phrase "suits ... at common law or in equity"

extended federal jurisdiction to cases that would have been heard by
English common law or high chancery courts in 1789.292 But in 1789,

English ecclesiastic courts (not common law or high chancery courts)
adjudicated core probate issues.

293

Thus, as the Court has explained,

288. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006).
289. Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199, 205 (1918); see also Marshall, 547 U.S. at 311
("[Tihe probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or annulment of a
will and the administration of a decedent's estate .... "); Markam v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490,
494 (1946) ("[A] federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate
290. Ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73 (1789); see also Allison Graves, Comment, Marshall v.
Marshall: The Past, Present,and Future of the Probate Exception to FederalJurisdiction,59
ALA. L. REV. 1643, 1643 (2007) (explaining why the probate exception has been linked to
the Judiciary Act).
291. Ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
292. See, e.g., Waterman v. Canal-La. Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909)
("[C]ontroversies between citizens of different States .. . are within the established equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts[, which] ... is like unto the high court of chancery in
England at the time of the adoption of the judiciary act of 1789 .... "). The diversity
statute now applies to "all civil actions" rather than "all suits .. . at common law or in
equity." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). Yet because Congress did not intend this change to
alter the scope of diversity jurisdiction, it did not eliminate the probate exception. See
Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
293. See, e.g., Sutton, 246 U.S. at 205 ("[Slince it does not pertain to the general
jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside a will or the probate thereof.., matters of this
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"a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an
estate" because
"the Judiciary Act ...did not extend to [these]
29 4
matters.
On a superficial level, there appears to be no dissonance between
the probate exception and the FAA as applied to core probate issues.
Because the FAA does not create federal subject matter
jurisdiction, 295 it is facially consistent with the Judiciary Act: neither
allows federal courts to hear core probate disputes. For example, if a
beneficiary alleges that a will was obtained by undue influence, only a
state court may resolve this core probate issue. Even if the parties are
diverse and the complaint seeks more than $75,000, the Judiciary Act
does not permit a federal court to hear the matter. And even if the
will contains an arbitration clause that triggers the FAA, the case
must remain in state court. The FAA does not enlarge federal
jurisdiction at all, let alone in a manner that contradicts the probate
exception.
But on closer inspection, applying the FAA to core probate
disputes would be anomalous. The FAA may not confer subject
matter jurisdiction, but it "creates a body of federal substantive law
establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate. '296 Applying the statute to core probate matters would thus
bring federal law into a niche that has long been the exclusive
province of the states. Compare the Court's oft-criticized decision
that the FAA preempts state contract law. As Ian Macneil argues, the
fact that the FAA passed unanimously reveals that Congress could
not have possibly intended the statute to override state contract
principles:
A mandatory federal requirement that the state courts grant
such specific performance in cases involving interstate

character are not within the ordinary equity jurisdiction of the federal courts ....
").Other
courts and scholars have criticized this logic. See, e.g., Ashton v. Josephine Bay Paul & C.
Michael Paul Found., Inc., 918 F.2d 1065, 1071 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Ecclesiastical courts are
not part of the American legal tradition, and the drafters of the Judiciary Act may well
have viewed chancery's deference to such courts as nothing but a quirk of English legal
history ....); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate
Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1502-14 (2001)
(explaining that English ecclesiastical courts only had exclusive jurisdiction of a fraction of
probate disputes). Because English courts of equity-not ecclesiastical courts-decided
trust issues, courts have generally limited the probate exception to wills. Id. at 1493 n.70.
294. Markam, 326 U.S. at 494.
295. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983).
296. Id.
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commerce would have been a major and extraordinary
expansion of federal power [in 1925]. It would hardly have
started another Civil War, but it would certainly have been
enough to cause an immense stir in legislative and legal
circles.97
Macneil's point rings true even though Congress has long regulated
contracts in some industries. 29 8 But Congress has never passed a law
that governs core probate issues. Thus, while federalizing contract law
would have been controversial, federalizing core probate issues would
have been unprecedented.
Extending the FAA to core probate matters would also have a
bizarre consequence. Because of the probate exception, Congress
would have created federal arbitration principles that federal district
and appellate courts could not enforce. Suppose a controversy
develops about whether the FAA preempts a certain state law rule.
Currently, federal and state courts share responsibility for answering
that question. 299 Even when the underlying case does not involve a
federal cause of action-for instance, a tort, contract, or state
statutory dispute-federal courts will resolve the FAA preemption
issue when sitting in diversity. Given the perception that state courts
are hotbeds of discrimination against the FAA,3 this check on state
judges is arguably a critical structural component of the statute. Yet
the probate exception ropes off an entire substantive area from
federal dockets. Reading the FAA to govern core probate cases
would thus give state courts total dominion over federal arbitration
law in this niche, subject only to the Court's limited certiorari power
over state court judgments.30 1 It seems unlikely that Congress would
3 2
have intended to aggrandize state courts in this manner.

297. MACNEIL, supranote 24, at 115.

298. This was true even at the time Congress passed the FAA. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1923) (regulating grain futures).
299. See, e.g., Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (II. 2010)
(noting that both state and federal courts resolve FAA preemption issues).
300. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1432 (2008)

("Certain state courts have been among the most vocal critics of arbitration's expansion
beyond commercial contexts.").
301. The Court has the power to review "state judicial decision[s] denying enforcement
of the contract to arbitrate." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (emphasis
added). But because the Court exercises its certiorari power so infrequently, as a practical
matter state courts would be free to apply the FAA to core probate issues with little
interference from federal authorities. Cf Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1505-06 (2006) ("In reality,

state court judgments resting upon the interpretation of federal statutes may-indeed, in
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The friction between core probate issues and arbitration
underscores this point. Core probate proceedings are in rem. As
noted above, in the early twentieth century, some judges refused to
compel arbitration of will contests on the grounds that in rem cases
are not well-suited for informal proceedings. 03 An unlikely source
may have breathed new life into those opinions. In its April 2011
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,3" the Court held that
class arbitration, with its detailed and time-consuming procedures, is
"inconsistent with the FAA."3 5 The Court reasoned that class
arbitration "includes absent parties," makes "[c]onfidentiality ...
more difficult," and "sacrifices the principal advantage of
arbitration-its informality."3 6 The same could be said for attempts
to arbitrate core probate cases. Courts cannot resolve core probate
issues without first giving all potential heirs and creditors a chance to
be heard. In turn, this means that a party must publish notice over the
course of several weeks of their intention to seek judicial
administration of an estate or to file a will contest.3 7 The in rem
nature of core probate issues-like class arbitration-thus "requires
procedural formality."3 8 It creates a nasty Catch-22. On the one
hand, relaxing the onerous notice requirements would create a risk
the overwhelming majority of cases today, do-govern the rights and duties of parties
subject to them without Supreme Court review.").
302. One might object that reading the FAA to exclude core probate disputes would
aggrandize state courts as much as reading the FAA to govern core probate disputes.
After all, if the statute does not cover core probate issues, state lawmakers can fill the gap
with whatever arbitration principles they desire. Arguably, that would be no different than
what I claim is perverse about interpreting the FAA to apply to core probate matters: the
fact that it gives states broad discretion over arbitration law. Yet this line of reasoning
conflates two issues: (1) power over arbitration generally and (2) power over the FAA
itself. Construing the FAA to exclude core probate issues would give state courts the first
kind of power, but not the second. Conversely, reading the FAA to govern core probate
disputes would give state courts both powers. It is this second component that seems
perverse: nowhere else in the statute did Congress give state judges nearly exclusive
dominion over federal arbitration law.
303. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
304. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
305. Id. at 1751.
306. Id. at 1750-51.
307. To get a sense of how detailed these requirements are, consider the California
Probate Code. The executor must publish notice "in a newspaper of general circulation in
the city where the decedent resided at the time of death." CAL. PROB. CODE § 8121 (West
2008). The first publication date must be "at least 15 days before the hearing," and
"[t]hree publications in a newspaper published once a week or more often, with at least
five days intervening between the first and last publication dates, not counting the
publication dates, are sufficient." Id. The caption of the notice "shall be in 8-point type or
larger and the text shall be in 7-point type or larger." Id. § 8123.
308. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
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that absent parties "would not be bound by the arbitration."'3 0 9 On the

other hand, adhering to the laborious probate court notice
requirements defeats the very purpose of arbitration: to streamline
dispute resolution. This incongruity suggests that core probate issues
are not amenable to arbitration.310
In sum, there are powerful reasons to exempt several common
types of cases involving wills from the FAA. Although this implied

exception would not apply to fiduciary litigation or any matter
involving a trust, it represents another way in which the statute's
coverage would be more fine-grained in probate than it is in the
contractual context. And again, this would create a window for states
to supplement the FAA with their own arbitration law.
C.

Separability
Testamentary arbitration under the FAA would also raise unique

issues under the separability doctrine. The separability rule arises
largely from section 4 of the FAA, which instructs courts how to

handle motions to compel arbitration:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue,
...the court shall make an order directing the parties to

proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement ....If the making of the arbitration agreement...

309. Id. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires "notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). However, most
courts have held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to bilateral arbitration
because "the state action element ...is absent." Davis v. Prudential Sec., 59 F.3d 1186,
1191 (11th Cit. 1995). Nevertheless, most judges and scholars have assumed that due
process is required in class arbitration. See, e.g., Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class
Arbitration,58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 226 (2006). Arguably, arbitration of core probate matters
would share some of the issues (notice requirements and concern for the rights of absent
parties) that underlie the extension of due process to class arbitration.
310. Admittedly, some courts also consider trust-related matters to be in rem or quasi
in rem. See, e.g., Brayton v. Bos. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 937 F. Supp. 150, 151 (D.R.I.
1996). However, many of these trust issues do not involve the same notice requirements as
core probate matters. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 19050 (West 2011) (requiring
executors and administrators of intestate estates to give notice to creditors), with id.
§ 19054 (not requiring trustees to provide such notice). Accordingly, there is less tension
between in rem and quasi in rem trust-related cases and arbitration than there is between
in rem core probate disputes and arbitration.
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be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof.3"
The separability doctrine exists because the Court has
interpreted the phrase "agreement for arbitration" in section 4 to
signify the arbitration clause, rather than the "container" contract in
which the arbitration clause appears. 12 Thus construed, section 4 only
permits judges to resolve claims that hinge on "the making of the
[arbitration clause]. 3 13 The Court has sometimes described the
separability rule in binary terms, drawing a bright line between
challenges to the validity of the arbitration clause (which are for
courts) and challenges to the validity of the container contract (which
314
are for arbitrators).
However, as noted above, the Court has created an exception to
this neat dichotomy. If a party claims that she never actually entered
into the container contract-insteadof contending that the container
contract is invalid under a contract defense such as duress, fraud, or
unconscionability-courts resolve the matter. Indeed, as the Court
recently opined in Granite Rock Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters,3 15 judges must decide issues that pertain to the "formation
of the parties' arbitration agreement."31' 6 Likewise, in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,317 the Court opined that a judge (not an
arbitrator) should decide whether a businessman was bound to
arbitrate in his individual capacity when a company that he owned
signed an agreement that included an arbitration clause.318 In a

311. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (linking the separability doctrine to section 4). At one point, state
courts seemed to be free to disregard the separability doctrine, since section 4 only applies
in "United States district court." 9 U.S.C. § 4; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) (noting that section 4
"appear[s] to apply only to proceedings in federal court"). However, the Court has
recently asserted that the separability "rule ultimately arises out of § 2," which extends the
rule into state courts as well. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447
(2006).
312. See, e.g., Prima Paint,388 U.S. at 402-04; see also Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445 ("[A]s
a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from
the remainder of the contract.").
313. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
314. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46 ("Unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause
itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first
instance.").
315. 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
316. Id. at 2858.
317. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
318. Id. at 943-44.
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subsequent case, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.,319 the Court
cited First Options for the proposition that "whether the parties are
bound by a given arbitration clause [is] ...for a court to decide."32
And even in Buckeye, the Court's most dramatic expansion of the
separability doctrine, the Court noted that "[t]he issue of the
contract's validity is different from the issue whether any agreement
' Thus, as Stephen Ware
between the [parties] was ever concluded."3 21
has noted, it appears that "the separability doctrine does not apply to
322
contract-formation arguments.
This doctrinal nuance would be critical to importing the
separability doctrine into probate. As I have argued, testamentary
arbitration cannot occur unless there is some indication that the
parties have consented to the terms of the will or trust. As a result,
any challenge to the validity of an estate plan would not only raise
traditional separability issues, but also separability issues that stem
from the gateway matter of whether litigants can be deemed to have
agreed to the instrument. Accordingly, the testamentary separability
rule would need to be two-pronged. First, as under the traditional
doctrine, courts would decide any challenge to the arbitration clause
itself. Just as in contractual separability, such a claim places the
"making of the arbitration agreement ...in issue" under section 4
3 23
and requires "the court [to] proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
Second, even when a party does not attempt to nullify the arbitration
clause specifically, a court may still be able to adjudicate the matter.
Many challenges to the container instrument-for instance, an
attempt to invalidate it completely-reveal that the litigant has not
acquiesced to its terms. Because those circumstances present the
question of "whether any agreement between the [parties] was ever
concluded, 3 24 they fall within the "formation" exception to the
separability doctrine. Like a litigant who argues that she never agreed
to the container contract, a party who has not accepted the terms of
the estate plan is entitled to a judicial forum for that claim.
To make this analysis concrete, recall the fact pattern where the
settlor creates a trust that contains an arbitration clause and divides
her estate among her best friend, her son, and her daughter. If the
daughter alleges that the trust is invalid on the grounds of undue
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

537 U.S. 79 (2002).
Id. at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006).
Ware, supra note 160, at 115.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444 n.1.

2012]

FAA AND TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS

1085

influence, she merely attempts to nullify the container instrument, not
the arbitration provision. Under the traditional rule, this would be
dispositive: "[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself,
the issue of the [instrument]'s validity is considered by the arbitrator
....
"325 However, that cannot also be the result in the context of

probate arbitration. There is simply no reason to bind the daughter to
arbitrate in the first instance. As her lawsuit indicates, she does not
assent to any of the trust's provisions. Under the formation exception
to the separability doctrine, a court must decide the merits of her
claim. Conversely, if the best friend asserted that the gift to the son
was invalid, the matter would go to the arbitrator. For one, the
complaint would target a particular part of the container instrument,
rather than the arbitration clause. In addition, the best friend needs
the trust to inherit: she would take nothing from the settlor without it.
The best friend must be seen as agreeing to all of the instrument's
provisions, and therefore does not fall within the formation
exception.
This bifurcated approach would make the probate separability
doctrine less troubling than its contractual counterpart. Critics have
cited the separability rule as further evidence that arbitration under
the FAA is not consensual.32 6 After all, one way a party can fail to

offer her authentic, autonomous assent to arbitrate is if she is
defrauded, coerced, or mistaken when she agrees to a contract that
contains an arbitration provision.3 27 But because the Court's
separability jurisprudence allows arbitrators to decide those very
allegations, it funnels litigants into a private forum even when they
did not "agree" to arbitrate in any meaningful sense.328 In sharp
contrast, the probate separability doctrine would not send these
claims to arbitration. For example, if a beneficiary alleges that a trust
that contains an arbitration clause is entirely invalid on the grounds of
fraud, he has not consented to the instrument's terms, and a court
must resolve his fraud claim. On the other hand, if the beneficiary
merely asserts that a single gift within the trust was obtained by fraud,
325. Id. at 445-46.
326. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the
Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration
Provisions,56 SMU L. REV. 819, 845 (2003) ("[S]eparability perverts contract law because
it assumes away the fundamental principle of contractual consent .. ");Stephen J. Ware,
Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 137 (1996)
(arguing that the separability doctrine must be abolished "to make the law well-suited to
ensure that arbitration is based on significant consent").
327. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 160, at 120-21.
328. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46.
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he seeks to increase his share under the trust and thus assents to its
provisions. In that circumstance, the arbitrator hears his fraud claim.
Critically, however, arbitration occurs only because of his consent to
the trust, not in the face of his pleas that he did not consent to the
trust.
D. Preemption

Of all the issues related to the Court's reading of the FAA,
perhaps none has been more of a lightning rod than preemption.
According to the Court, the statute eclipses state law in two ways.
First, it prohibits state courts and lawmakers from singling out
arbitration clauses for invalidity.329 Because section 2 requires judges
to enforce arbitration provisions "save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,"33 states can
regulate arbitration clauses through rules that apply to "any
contract," such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability.331 For
example, Alabama cannot ban pre-dispute arbitration clauses,332

California cannot exempt franchise and employment cases from
arbitration,333 and Montana cannot require drafters to give
conspicuous notice that an agreement contains an arbitration
clause.334 Second, the Court recently held that even when states apply

generally applicable contract defenses to arbitration clauses, they
' of
cannot do so in a way that thwarts the "purposes and objectives"3 35
the FAA, which are to streamline dispute resolution.336

Unfortunately, applying these tests has proven difficult. The
trouble lies with a wide range of state regulation that is both (1)
capable of nullifying arbitration clauses but (2) does not apply only to
329. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) ("Courts
may not ... invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions.").
330. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
331. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 ("[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such
as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2."); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) ("[S]tate law,
whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.").
332. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,269 (1995).
333. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-91 (finding the same for wage and hour claims);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (finding that a California statute
cannot exempt franchise disputes from arbitration).
334. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
335. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 57 (1941)).
336. Id. at 1748.
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arbitration clauses.337 For example, the Illinois Nursing Home Act
outlaws jury trial waivers in nursing home admission contracts,338 and
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act confers a non-waivable
right to bring a class action in cases arising from "the sale or lease of
' 9 Although neither law expressly
goods or services to any consumer."33
governs arbitration, both can be used to strike down all or part of an
arbitration clause. Does the FAA preempt these statutes because
they can annul arbitration clauses and yet only apply to some
contracts (not "any contract")? Or do these laws survive because they
do not govern arbitration provisions exclusively? The issue divided
courts in both states.34 °
Even with this doctrinal uncertainty, some wills and trusts
principles stand out as likely candidates for preemption. For one, as
noted, a few courts have refused to compel arbitration of challenges
to the validity of a testamentary instrument based on vague notions of
state public policy, or on the related grounds that the legislature has
given the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over those cases.341 The
FAA would trump these decisions. As the Court has made clear,
"state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum ... are
superseded by the FAA. ' 342 State judges could also no longer refuse
to send trust disputes to arbitration on the grounds that state
343
arbitration statutes only validate arbitration clauses in "contracts.
This literal interpretation of the word "contract" must yield to the
Court's broader reading, which includes wills and trusts.
In another relatively straightforward application of FAA
preemption, states could not regulate arbitration clauses in the same
way that they have policed similar provisions in wills and trusts.

337. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1189, 1199 (2011) (noting that these laws "point to a gaping hole in FAA preemption
jurisprudence); cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND.
L.J. 393, 394 (2004) (noting the uncertainty about how to treat these laws as well as those
that regulate the arbitration process (as opposed to individual arbitration clauses)).
338. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/3-606 to -607 (West 2008).
339. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1751, 1770(a), 1781(a) (West 2009).
340. Compare Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 11-14 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010) (holding that the Nursing Home Act was preempted), with Carter v. SSC Odin
Operating Co., 885 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (finding that the statute was
not preempted), overruled by Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1219
(II. 2010). Compare also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that

the Consumer Legal Remedies Act was preempted), with Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imps.
LLC, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24, 34 (Ct. App. 2010) (reaching the opposite conclusion).

341. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
342. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008).
343. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
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Consider the no-contest clause. Some jurisdictions refuse to enforce
no-contest clauses in any circumstances. 3" Other states exempt
certain claims, such as challenges to an executor or trustee's exercise
of their basic fiduciary duties.345 And still others prohibit blanket nocontest clauses, requiring testators and settlors to identify with
particularity the claims which will cause a forfeiture.3 46 These
approaches would not be viable with respect to arbitration clauses.

No matter how well-intentioned, policymakers cannot "invalidate
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration
' Thus, for example, the FAA
provisions."347
would preempt statutes
that purported to exclude trust contests from arbitration, or required

all testamentary arbitration clauses to appear in a large, eye-catching
font.34 8
Inevitably, however, more challenging issues would materialize.

Recall that several states subject exculpatory clauses in trusts to
heightened scrutiny. 349 As noted above, an arbitration clause that

deprives beneficiaries of remedies against a trustee creates a
dilemma: because the anti-exculpatory clause rules govern trusts, they
are not "grounds ... for the revocation of any contract.""35 Like the
Illinois and California laws noted above, the anti-exculpatory clause
doctrines have the potential to nullify portions of arbitration clauses
but do not exclusively govern arbitration clauses. In fact, this issue is
even thornier. At least the Illinois and California statutes offer a
"ground ... to revo[ke]" a contract. Conversely, the exculpatory
clause doctrines do not apply to contracts at all.

344. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2010) ("A provision in a will purporting to
penalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings
relating to the estate is unenforceable."); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2 (West Supp. 2011)
("[No contest] provisions shall be void and of no force or effect."). Other states enforce
no-contest clauses only when a litigant lacks "probable cause" for a lawsuit. See In re
Estate of Peppler v. Connelly, 971 P.2d 694, 697 (Colo. App. 1998); Hannam v. Brown, 956
P.2d 794, 798 (Nev. 1998).
345. See, e.g., Wojtalewicz v. Woitel (In re Estate of Wojtalewicz), 418 N.E.2d 418,
420-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that no-contest clauses cannot waive beneficiaries'
right to challenge accounting); In re Andrus' Will, 281 N.Y.S. 831, 851-61 (Sur. Ct. 1935)
(holding that a no-contest clause cannot require unwavering allegiance to the trustee's
decisions and immunize the trustee from liability for gross administrative negligence).
346. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21311(a)(3) (West 2011) (providing that no-contest
clauses can govern creditor's claims only if the clause "expressly [so] provides").
347. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
348. See id. (holding that the FAA preempts a Montana statute designed to inform
adherents that a particular agreement contains an arbitration clause).
349. See supra note 232.
350. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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Accordingly, even more than the Illinois and California laws, the

exculpatory clause rules tee up the question of what the scope of
FAA preemption should be. Most courts have held that even if a state

law does not single out arbitration clauses, it must apply to "any
contract" to avoid preemption.351 Of course, under this majority view,
the exculpatory clause doctrines-which cannot apply to contracts-

would be preempted. Yet it is not clear that the "any contract" test
makes sense. As noted above, it would seem to preempt the entire
UCC (which only governs contracts for the sale of goods)352 and the
unconscionability doctrine (which applies almost exclusively to
adhesion contracts). 353 These bizarre outcomes do not serve any

plausible congressional purpose.
What seems more compelling is to understand FAA preemption

as serving two objectives. First, the statute eclipses state law to
prohibit jurisdictions from reviving the ouster and revocability
doctrines through measures that target arbitration clauses and only
arbitration clauses. 354 Second, FAA preemption ensures that states do
not enact laws that seem neutral on their face, but are in fact guerrilla
warfare against arbitration. For instance, the FAA would eclipse state
laws that require judicially monitored discovery or the application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence in arbitration.355 These rules would

undermine
proceedings.

the
356

FAA's

purpose of "facilitat[ing]

streamlined

State restrictions on exculpatory clauses in wills and trusts suffer
from neither infirmity. First, they are not like the ouster and
revocability doctrines because they apply equally to estate plans that
contain arbitration clauses as well as estate plans that do not. Second,
351. See Aragaki, supra note 337, at 1204-05; see also Carter v. SSC Odin Operating
Co., 927 N.E.2d 1207, 1218 (Ill. 2010) (holding that the FAA preempts the Illinois Nursing
Care Act and reasoning that state laws may be preempted even if "they do not 'single out'
arbitration agreements for special treatment").
352. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012), available at 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13, 17-18 (2011), http://colloquy.law
.northwestern.edu/main/2011/08/unconscionability-wars.html.
354. See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233,
1247 (2011) ("Enforcement-impeding laws that 'single out' arbitration ...are always
preempted."); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1996) ("Any law that
singles out arbitration agreements by making them less enforceable than other contracts is
preempted by the FAA."). But see Stephen J.Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory
Arbitration, and State ConstitutionalJury- Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 46-48 (2003)
(endorsing the "any contract" approach).
355. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,1741 (2011).
356. Id. at 1748.
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since state regulation of liability-limiting terms does not make
arbitration any slower or more formal, it does not erect an obstacle to
the FAA's core goals. Both of these conclusions remain true despite
the fact that the exculpatory clause rules do not apply to contractslet alone "any contract."
Nevertheless, I do not deny that the FAA would trump some
wills and trusts principles and limit state autonomy to regulate
testamentary arbitration clauses in other ways. And as with
contractual arbitration, FAA preemption of probate doctrine raises
federalism concerns. When judges and policymakers face the task of
drawing the boundaries of testamentary arbitration, I hope that these
dangers will prompt them to restrict the statute's coverage as I have
described in the previous sections.
CONCLUSION

After fundamentally altering the way consumer and employment
disputes are resolved, the FAA's next frontier will be wills and trusts.
Unlike state law, which requires an arbitration clause to appear in a
contract, the FAA applies if the parties have agreed to arbitrate.
Because executors, trustees, and beneficiaries consent to arbitration
when they accept benefits under an instrument that contains an
arbitration clause, they fall within the FAA. In turn, this raises
difficult questions about how the statute will affect probate. I have
argued that courts and lawmakers should pay careful attention to who
can be bound by a testamentary arbitration provision and the
boundaries of the statute. By doing so, they can capitalize on the
benefits of arbitration while avoiding many of its drawbacks.

